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This thesis seeks to define the normative nature and content of the prohibition of retrogression under the rules of international law, 
as applicable in Finland. Further, this thesis seeks to examine the effectiveness of the implementation and protection of social rights 
in Finland; in particular, the operation of the prohibition of retrogression in the Finnish system of constitutional review and human 
rights impact assessment.  
 
Under article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 12(3) of the European Social 
Charter, state parties are under an obligation to progressively realise a higher level of social rights. The mirror principle of this 
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of retrogression. From these decisions and statements it is possible to derive certain criteria for assessing compliance with the 
prohibition of retrogression: the regressive measure has to be temporary, it has to be necessary and proportionate, it cannot be 
discriminatory and the minimum core content of each respective rights has to be protected. 
 
The effectiveness of social rights can be seen as a tool for promoting equality, justice and democracy in society, as the effective 
enjoyment of social rights increases the participation of vulnerable groups within it. Therefore, compliance with the prohibition of 
retrogression is particularly crucial at times of economic recession in order to protect the rights of these most vulnerable groups. The 
effectiveness of social rights can be argued to consist of an effective monitoring system within a particular state, effective remedies 
for an individual, and the commitment of all public authorities to conduct a systematic human rights impact assessment on different 
levels of decision-making. It is argued that through these mechanisms, compliance with the prohibition of retrogression could be 
sufficiently guaranteed. 
 
In Finland, the monitoring of the realisation of social rights is based on the competence of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
Chancellor of Justice of the Government and various administrative authorities. Additionally, the supranational supervisory 
mechanisms, in particular the collective complaint procedure under the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, 
complement the domestic system of monitoring. Reviewing the constitutionality of new legislation has, however, traditionally fallen 
under the competence of the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament. The prohibition of retrogression is mainly of relevance 
in the ex ante constitutional review by the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament. In certain individual cases the prohibition 
can also be of relevance within the courts. This kind of ex post review by courts could, however, take place mainly through a human 
rights friendly interpretation or through the enforcement of subjective social rights. Due to the nature of the prohibition of 
retrogression, the norm should primarily be taken into account by the legislature before any decisions on potentially regressive 
measures have been made.  
 
The operation of the prohibition of retrogression in the Finnish system of constitutional review and human rights impact assessment 
can be seen as partly ineffective due to the fact that the budgetary decision-making is not subject to systematic human rights impact 
assessment. This means that while resource allocations in budget decisions may have a regressive impact on social rights, the 
requirements of the prohibition of retrogression are not being reviewed in this context. This cannot be seen as justifiable, considering 
that the prohibition of retrogression requires a state to conduct a sufficient analysis on the potential impacts on social rights and to 
explore alternative options in order to avoid negative impacts on the rights of the most vulnerable groups in the society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RECESSION AND CHALLENGES TO WELFARE STATES  
 
The modern welfare state. What does it consist of? One could list such things as social 
services, the right to education and protection of the most vulnerable groups. Moreover, 
democracy and the promotion of equality must also be mentioned since they, after all, are 
the very essence of the welfare state as a concept.1 It follows that in order to reach the goals 
of a modern welfare state, a state needs to guarantee the effective enjoyment of certain rights 
to all. These rights entail civil and political and economic, social and cultural human rights. 
With that said, economic, social and cultural rights in particular have become relevant in 
tandem with the emergence of the modern welfare state. Yet they have not gained as much 
attention as civil and political human rights.2 In particular, the question of which conditions 
limit social human rights has remained relatively open.3 Whilst not all4 human rights are 
absolute rights and can therefore be limited in certain situations, the principles concerning 
the limitation of social human rights have not been clearly defined. This can be seen as 
problematic since the lack of strict rules governing the grounds for limitation might lead to 
arbitral decisions by states, in particular in circumstances of economic recession. This, of 
course, reduces the effectiveness of the enjoyment of social rights. 
 
                                                        
1 See eg Fredman, Sandra: Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford 
University Press 2008), 32-40. 
2 Ssenyonjo, Manisuli: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 
2009), 4-5. 
3 See about the discussion -or the lack of it- in the Finnish constitutional law context: Rautiainen 
Pauli: ‘Perusoikeuden heikennyskielto’ (2013) 261 Oikeus 42, 262-3. 
4 International law recognises certain peremptory norms (jus cogens) from which no derogation is 
permitted. See eg Shelton, Dinah: ‘International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’’ in Evans, Malcolm 
(ed): International Law (Oxford University Press 2010), 146-57. Also certain fundamental rights 
have been protected as absolute rights in the Constitution of Finland. See eg Viljanen, Veli-Pekka: 
’Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen’ in Hallberg, Pekka, Karapuu, Heikki, Ojanen, Tuomas, Scheinin, 
Martti, Tuori, Kaarlo and Viljanen, Veli-Pekka (eds): Perusoikeudet (WSOYpro 2011), 140. 
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Since 2009, Europe has been undergoing a period of outstanding difficulty in terms of 
financial stability. The European economic crisis emerged after the so-called Great 
Recession and resulted from a situation where European governments were not able to repay 
or refinance their government debts.5 Starting in 2009 and continuing until today, several 
states have been forced to take various austerity measures in order to counter the debt crisis.6 
The implementation of these measures has invoked criticism and discussion about the 
legitimacy of the actions: non-state actors and academics have started to look for effective 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights and, in particular, for more clearly defined 
guidelines to mitigate the limitation of these rights.7  
 
Admittedly, article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights8 (‘ICESCR’) can be argued to contain certain guidelines for the limitation of social 
rights under the ICESCR. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR requires each State Party to:  
 
“take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.  
 
One logical consequence of this principle of progressive realisation is the mirror principle 
of non-regression; where state parties are generally obliged not to take regressive measures, 
since taking those measures would mean diverging from the obligation to take steps towards 
the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.9 The principle of non-regression 
can also be called as the prohibition of retrogression. The specific content of the norm has 
nevertheless been defined neither in the treaty text nor in the travaux preparatoires of the 
                                                        
5 See eg European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (“FRA”), ‘Protecting Fundamental rights 
during the economic crisis’ (2010), 6-9.  
6 See eg The European Law Students’ Association, ‘Austerity measures and their implications. The 
role of the European Social Charter in maintaining minimum social standards in countries 
undergoing austerity measures’ (July 2015) at 
http://files.elsa.org/AA/LRG_SocialRights/Final_Report.pdf (accessed 10 August 2015). 
7 Rautiainen 2013, 261-2. 
8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (“ICESCR”). 
9 Ssenyonjo 2009, 59. 
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ICESCR, leading to a situation where the nebulous scope of the obligation makes economic, 
social and cultural rights litigation challenging.10 At the same time the economic downturn 
has forced many European states to take austerity measures, i.e. to deviate from the general 
prohibition to take regressive measures, raising questions about the de facto effectiveness of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The question about the legal definition of the principle 
of non-regression has, therefore, become more relevant than ever. 
 
While the impact of the current economic crisis in Finland has not so far been as significant 
as in some other European countries, the effective realisation of social rights has similarly 
emerged as a topical issue in Finnish debate. The Government’s plans concerning structural 
reforms have raised questions as to whether the human rights impact assessment vis-à-vis 
these measures has been sufficient.11 Whilst the prohibition of retrogression has not been 
significantly addressed in Finnish fundamental and human rights discourse,12 it is, indeed, 
an important question to ask also in the domestic context; whether the Finnish monitoring 
system makes it possible to take the full realisation of social rights into account.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRUCTURE 
 
The objective of this thesis is twofold. The research questions to be examined are the 
following: 
 
1) What is the nature and content of the prohibition of retrogression? 
2) How effective is the implementation and protection of social rights in Finland? In 
particular, how does the prohibition of retrogression operate in the Finnish system 
of constitutional review and human rights impact assessment? 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Its emphasis is on the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
social rights in the Finnish constitutional law system, in particular on the relevance of the 
                                                        
10 Nolan, Aoife, Lusiani, Nicholas J and Courtis Christian: ‘Two steps forward, no steps back? 
Evolving criteria of the prohibition of retrogression in economic and social rights’ in Nolan, Aoife 
(ed): Economic and Social rights after the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 
2014), 9. 
11 Helsingin Sanomat: ’Oikeustieteilijät: Hallitus sivuuttaa menoleikkauksista ihmisoikeudet’ (16 
June 2015). 
12 Rautiainen 2013, 263. 
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principle of non-regression. However, because the system for protection of human rights is 
a pluralist system, one cannot look merely at the domestic legislation.13 It must be noted here 
already that Finland’s constitution creates an obligation for the public authorities to 
guarantee the protection of human rights and to comply with applicable rules of international 
human rights law.14 The aim of part one is to examine and systematise the legal debate 
concerning the content of rules governing the limitation of social rights, in particular the 
principle of non-regression, under international law. For this purpose I will examine the 
reasoning of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’), which is 
the supervisory body of the ICESCR; of the European Committee of Social Rights (‘ECSR’), 
which is the supervisory organ of the European Social Charter (’ESC’)15; and of various 
European constitutional courts. In part two, the focus will shift from defining the principle 
under international law to evaluating its relevance and the effectiveness of social rights in 
the Finnish constitutional law context. In order to do this, I will look into the constitutional 
review system in Finland and into any remedies that are available for an individual after an 
alleged breach of social rights.  
 
Finally, to discuss the effectiveness and the underlying ratio of the principle of non-
regression, it must be asked whether there is a real justification for the divorce between the 
different types of human rights. The effective protection of human rights requires after all 
the effective implementation of both civil and political and economic, social and cultural 
human rights16; economic crisis and austerity measures do not only have impact on the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights but also on various civil and political 
                                                        
13 On the pluralist nature of human rights obligations see eg Fabbrini, Federeco, ‘The European 
Multilevel System for the Protection of Fundamental Rights: A ‘neo-federalist’ perspective’ (2010) 
5 Jean Monnet Working Paper, 1-60. 
14  Constitution of Finland section 22. See also Heinonen, Tuuli and Lavapuro, Juha: ‘Suomen 
oikeuden eurooppalaistuminen ja valtiosääntöistyminen 1990–2012’ in Heinonen, Tuuli and 
Lavapuro, Juha (eds): Oikeuskulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2012), 
10. 
15 European Social Charter (revised) (adopted 3 May 1996, entered into force 1 July 1999) CETS 
163. 
16 For more examples, see Ssenyonjo 2009, 59. See also Alston, Philip and Quinn, Gerard: ’The 
Nature and Scope of States parties’ Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’, (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 172; Steiner, Henry: 
’International Protection of Human Rights’ in Evans, Malcolm (ed): International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010), 804-6 and Mowbray, Alastair: The Development of Positive Obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing 2004).  
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rights. Nolan, for instance, has noted that cuts to legal aid and increases in legal fees have 
also had an effect on equal access to justice.17 Likewise, the realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights cannot be said to be effective if there is no real access to justice in cases 
of violations of these rights. The effective realisation of economic, social and cultural rights 
has been argued as crucial in promoting equality and democracy in the society.18 This thesis 
seeks to point out interconnections between the effectiveness of social rights and equality.  
 
Part I and Part II both contain two chapters. The thesis has separate chapters for the 
introduction and conclusions. Chapter Two contains a more general introduction to the 
history and nature of the economic, social and cultural rights and the principle of progressive 
realisation. In Chapter Three, the focus will be on the legal nature and substantive conditions 
of the principle of non-regression. I will derive the content of the principle from the practice 
of the CESCR, the ECSR and various judicial organs, particularly the domestic 
constitutional courts.  
 
In Chapter Four I will introduce the history and current state of the Finnish system of 
constitutional review. Chapter Four includes also an evaluation of the operation of the 
principle of non-regression in the Finnish system for constitutional review. In Chapter Five 
I will first point out what impact the effectiveness of social rights has on equality and 
democracy. After this I will evaluate the effectiveness of the Finnish system of monitoring, 
in particular, whether an individual has effective remedies available when she feels that her 
social rights have not been fully realised. In the course of doing this, I seek to demonstrate 
how compliance with the principle of non-regression is an inherent part of the effective 
realisation of social rights. In Chapter Six I will conclude by outlining the research results. 
 
1.3 METHOD AND SOURCES  
 
As for the method and sources that will be used, it must first be noted that in practice courts 
and other judicial organs have been faced with certain methodological difficulties when 
trying to apply the principle of non-regression. This is because defining the causal link 
                                                        
17 Nolan, Aoife: ‘Introduction’ in Nolan, Aoife (ed): Economic and Social rights after the Global 
Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2014), 16. On the indivisibility of ESC rights and civil 
and political rights, see e.g. Ssenyonjo 2009, 51 and 59. 
18 Fredman 2008, 103-13. 
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between a new legislative action and alleged regressive consequences can be challenging.19 
For the purposes of this thesis the empirical aspect of retrogression will not as such be 
examined, i.e. it will not be necessary to consider whether a particular legislative action has 
de facto had regressive impacts. Rather, the focus in part one of the thesis will be upon 
outlining the general conditions and limits of the principle of non-regression. In part two, 
the focus will be in particular on examining the operation of the principle of non-regression 
in the Finnish system for constitutional review and the interrelationship of the principle and 
the effectiveness of social rights. Therefore, the traditional legal dogmatic method will serve 
as a starting point.20 
 
Secondly, as for the sources that will be used, the limits of the principle of non-regression 
are to be derived from international law. Therefore, in part one, I will refer to the sources of 
international law, namely those listed in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, in order to define the content of the principle of non-regression. Those sources 
are: 
 
1) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting states ; 
2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ; 
3) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations ; and 
4) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.21  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, provisions under the ICESCR and the ESC are of particular 
relevance, as Finland is a state party to both of these conventions. Provisions of human rights 
conventions are often given a more precise content by their supervisory bodies in their legal 
practice.22 As such, also statements and decisions by the CESCR and the ECSR shall be used 
as sources. Case law of European domestic courts will be referred to in order to demonstrate 
                                                        
19 Nolan, Lusiani and Courtis 2014, 121-145 and 127. 
20 Aarnio, Aulis: ‘Oikeussäännösten systematisointi ja tulkinta’ in Häyhä, Juha (ed): Minun Metodini 
(Werner Söderström Lakitieto Oy 1997), 36-7. 
21 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 24 October 1945), art 38.  
22 Ojanen, Tuomas: ’From Constitutional Periphery toward the Center –Transformations of Judicial 
Review in Finland’ (2009) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift för Menneskerettigheter 194, 200. 
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that certain conditions for the limitation of social rights have been generally accepted. I have 
chosen to refer solely to those European cases that have occurred during the current 
economic crisis. Once the focus shifts to the operation of the principle in the domestic 
constitutional system, it is not only logical but also necessary to apply the sources of the 
Finnish legal system, in particular the statements of the Finnish Constitutional Law 
Committee and case law of the domestic courts. 
 
1.4 TERMINOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The scope of this thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the effectiveness of social rights. 
Therefore, I will refer to economic and cultural rights merely if reference to those substantive 
rights is relevant in order to examine the content of the principle of non-regression. 
Moreover, the system for the protection of human rights is, admittedly, a pluralist system 
and rules other than the principle of non-regression may also create obligations for states 
when they seek to limit social rights. With that being said, the emphasis of this thesis is on 
defining the principle of non-regression. Other rules governing the limitation of social rights 
will be discussed only if they are relevant for this purpose. 
 
Whilst EU law is naturally of relevance in the Finnish legal system, for the purposes of this 
thesis I will refer to the union legislation and legal practice only if it is relevant in defining 
and examining the prohibition of retrogression. Moreover, this thesis does not seek to 
examine the questions concerning the potential international responsibility of a state that 
may arise from violations of social human rights obligations. The focus is on the remedies 
that are available for an individual, not on the international responsibility between sovereign 
states. 
 
As for the terminology of the thesis, by the term positive rights I refer to economic, social 
and cultural rights, as they are usually conceptualised as creating positive obligations to a 
state, as shall be noted in the next chapter. This choice of terminology does not, however, 
imply that human rights other than economic, social and cultural rights cannot create positive 
obligations, or that strong distinctions between different types of human rights is even 
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advisable.23 Also, it must be noted that the terms principle of non-regression and prohibition 
of retrogression will be used throughout the thesis interchangeably. 
 
Moreover, I have sought to pursue terminology that will recognise the interdependency of 
fundamental and human rights. The development of social rights in Finland has been 
influenced by both domestic and international trends. As such, it cannot be said that certain 
social rights in the Finnish constitution would only be relevant as fundamental rights; the 
content of those rights must be derived from the international level, from the content of the 
respective human rights. 24 Consequently, for the purpose of this thesis, the term social rights 
shall be used to refer to the group of substantive social rights, regardless of their status as 
fundamental rights or human rights. It must nevertheless be noted that international human 
rights set only the minimum standard for the domestic implementation of human rights.25 
Therefore, if and when the scope of the thesis requires distintinction between these two levels 
of social rights, they will be referred to separately as fundamental rights and human rights. 
 
 
                                                        
23 See Fredman 2008, 9-10. 
24  See eg Ojanen 2009, 194-207. Ojanen argues that domestic sources, EU membership and 
international human rights treaties have all had a major impact on the role of courts, judicial review 
and the interpretation of constitutional norms in Finland. 
25 Heinonen and Lavapuro 2012, 8-11. 
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PART I: LIMITATION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
2. NATURE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
2.1 A SHORT HISTORY  
 
To understand the questions concerning the effectiveness of social rights and the nature of 
the rules governing their limitation, one must first look at the history of human rights and, 
in particular, at the emergence of economic, social and cultural rights. Human rights have 
traditionally been categorised into two groups due to their historical origins. The reason for 
the distinction between these groups of rights and the creation of two separate human rights 
instruments, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR‘)26 
and the ICESCR, is the ideological conflict between the East and West at the time of 
drafting.27 The Soviet states, on the one hand, sought to embrace the cause of economic, 
social and cultural rights as they saw them closely linked with the socialist ideology.  On the 
other hand, the Western states found it crucial to promote the recognition of civil and 
political rights, “the foundation of liberty and democracy in the free world”.28 As a result, 
two separate human rights treaties and two classes of human rights were created.  
                                                        
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 
27 See, however, O’Cinneide, Colm: ‘Austerity and the faded dream of a ‘social Europe’’ in Nolan, 
Aoife (ed): Economic and Social rights after the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press 
2014), 170. O’Cinneide argues that positive rights in Europe are not merely a post WW II concept. 
28  Craven, Matthew: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on its Development (Oxford University Press 1995), 8-9. 
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The so-called first generation of human rights seeks to protect in particular civil and political 
rights, which are to a great extent based on such core principles as human dignity and non-
discrimination. The second generation of human rights is based on the idea that everyone 
should have equal opportunities and rights to participate in society.29 The first generation of 
human rights has traditionally been perceived as creating negative obligations for states: a 
state is under an obligation not to deprive an individual of her fundamental freedoms. These 
negative obligations have also been known as duties of restraint.30 The second generation of 
human rights, on the other hand, requires positive contribution from a state: the underlying 
idea is to create material equality rather than formal. This might - and often does – require 
an element of financial subsidiarity.31 With that said, as has been noted above, too strict a 
division between these two categories of rights has been argued to be artificial.32 Ultimately, 
civil and political rights can create positive obligations for a state and economic, social and 
cultural rights can operate also as duties of restraint.  
 
Admittedly, positive rights fall to a great extent into the second generation of human rights, 
i.e. the fulfilment of these rights by a state requires sufficient funding and resources. This 
does not mean, however, that the fulfilment of first-generation rights would be without 
relevance when implementing second-generation rights. Quite the opposite in fact, as the 
fulfilment of civil and political rights is also necessary in order to effectively implement 
positive rights. This is evidenced inter alia by the fact that certain major human rights 
conventions require respect for equality, non-discrimination and democracy.33 The common 
ground of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights is by definition the very 
same: promoting equality and democracy in the society. Therefore, these two generations of 
                                                        
29 Mikkola, Matti: Social Human Rights of Europe (2010 Karelactio), 6-7. Mikkola lists also the third 
generation of human rights. These rights aim at people’s right to promote their collective interests, 
such as right to clean environment, peace and self-determination. The examination of this category 
is nevertheless outside the scope of this thesis. 
30 Fredman 2008, 1. 
31 Mikkola 2010, 7. 
32 Fredman 2008, 70. 
33 See eg Mikkola, Matti: ‘Social Rights as Human Rights in Europe’ (2000) 2 European Journal of 
Social Security 259, 259-272. Mikkola notes that the rights recognised European Social Charter 
complements the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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human rights are interdependent and indivisible.34 This view has been widely accepted by 
the international community.35 
 
As illustrated above, the effective realisation of positive rights usually requires material 
input, i.e. human resources and funding, by a state. But how much exactly is a state required 
to invest in the effective realisation of social rights? Under which conditions can a state 
reduce the level of investment already established? In answering these questions, one must 
look at the legal principle concerning the effective implementation of positive rights. This 
principle is called the principle of progressive realisation and its operation will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 
2.2 A STARTING POINT: ARTICLE 2(1) OF THE ICESCR  
 
One may argue that the single most important provision concerning the nature and limitation 
of social rights can be found in article 2(1) of the ICESCR. According to this article: 
 
“[…]each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption 
of legislative measures.” 
 
Article 2(1) is not a substantive social right as such, but instead applies as a general rule 
when a state party implements substantive rights under the ICESCR.36 The content of article 
2(1) has been discussed by the CESCR in its general comments. The nature of states’ 
obligations under article 2(1) of the ICESCR has also been commented upon in the so-called 
Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
                                                        
34 Craven 1995, 7-16.  
35 See eg Proclamation of Teheran, UNGA Res 32/130 (16 December 1977) UN Doc A/Res/32/130, 
para 13. 
36 See eg Riedel, Eibe: ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)’ in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed): The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online ed). 
  12 
 
 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1987 (‘Limburg Principles’).37 The Limburg Principles have 
been supplemented by the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of 1997 (‘Maastricht Guidelines’).38 Also article 12(3) of the ESC creates an 
obligation upon state parties to “endeavour to raise progressively the system of social 
security to a higher level”, thereby imposing a somewhat similar prohibition of retrogression 
that must be respected by the state parties to the ESC, for instance by Finland. In this chapter 
I will examine the prohibition from the viewpoint of article 2(1) of the ICESCR, but the 
considerations presented below also apply, to a large extent, when one talks about the 
prohibition under the ESC.  
 
The phrasing of article 2(1) of the ICESCR is relatively vague and leaves much room for 
interpretation. Specifically, two general observations must be made. First, article 2(1) creates 
an obligation to “achieve progressively the full realisation”, i.e. establishes the standard of 
progressive realisation. This concept, however, has not been further defined in the text of 
the ICESCR, leaving the definition obscure.  Second, according to article 2(1) state parties 
are under an obligation to utilise maximum available resources. The ICESCR does not 
require a state to take steps that would require utilisation of resources beyond what is 
available.39 Here, also, the same interpretational problem arises: how does one define what 
resources of a state are available? 
 
When we consider the interpretation of these terms, it must be noted that article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR is a treaty provision and, as such, is binding between the state parties. Therefore, 
its content must be defined through the general rule of treaty interpretation, which is a rule 
of customary international law.40 The rule has been codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) in 1969.41 
According to the rule the treaty must be interpreted “in good faith and in accordance with 
                                                        
37 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17)  
38 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’, (adopted 26 January 1997). 
39 Ssenyonjo 2009, 62. 
40 The International Court of Justice has confirmed the customary law nature of these articles, See 
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v Chad) (1994) ICJ Rep 6, para 41; Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island (Botswana v Namibia) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para 18. 
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331 
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the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose”. The interpretation may be supplemented by recourse to the 
preparatory work of the treaty.42 Therefore, in order to discover the more precise content of 
article 2(1), one must first look into the ordinary meaning of the terms progressive 
realisation and maximum available resources. We must also define the object and purpose 
of the ICESCR.  
 
It has been generally established in academic discussion that the very object and purpose of 
the ICESCR - as well as of other human rights treaties - is the effective realisation of human 
rights. 43  Therefore, the interpretation of the ICESCR should be as favourable to the 
individual as possible and any limitations on rights should be interpreted narrowly. 44 
Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has frequently found that 
human rights provisions ought to be interpreted so as to make their implementation as 
effective as possible.45 Therefore, to interpret the terms progressive realisation and all 
available resources in the light of the object and purpose of the covenant, one must seek for 
the most human-rights-orientated interpretation available. Some guidelines can be found in 
the statements of the CESCR.  
 
As for the maximum available resources the CESCR has stated that the phrase refers to “both 
the resources existing within a State as well as those available from the international 
community through international cooperation and assistance”.46 It follows that the term does 
not refer merely to certain resources within one particular state, but rather to resources 
available within the society as a whole; ranging from the public and private sectors to the 
international community.47 This interpretation appears to be in accordance with the general 
rule of treaty interpretation in the sense that the ordinary meaning of the phrase refers to all 
                                                        
42 VCLT arts 31-2. 
43 Ssenyonjo 2009, 51.  
44 Craven 1995, 3. 
45 See eg Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 87; Artico v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 1, para 33 and 
Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, para 72. 
46 CESCR, ‘Statement: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the ’Maximum of Available 
Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’, (10 May 2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1, 
para 5. 
47 Chapman, Audrey and Russell, Sage ‘Introduction’, in Chapman, Audrey and Russell, Sage (eds): 
Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 
2002), 11. 
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kinds of available resources.48 That being said, there is yet to be common ground as to 
whether this establishes an international obligation to assist: during the drafting of the 
ICESCR states did not clearly agree on the existence of any well-defined obligation to offer 
international assistance to a state struggling with its obligations under the Covenant.49 For 
the time being it is difficult to see a situation where a failure to comply with this kind of an 
obligation to assist would trigger international responsibility. For instance, the International 
Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has held that a state has an obligation to guarantee rights under the 
ICESCR only within the territories it has sovereignty and within those over which that state 
exercises territorial jurisdiction.50 The general rule seems to be that each state party has an 
obligation to seek the assistance of other states when it is not able to meet its own treaty 
obligations, while the obligation of other states to offer financial assistance is considerably 
more vague. Of course, monitoring whether a state allocates the maximum of available 
resources for the realisation of social rights is extremely challenging. 51  Whilst certain 
indicators, such as the percentage of the national budget allocated to the ICESCR rights and 
comparisons between states of the same level of development, have been developed by the 
CESCR in their concluding observations,52 the lack of sufficient national data53 and case law 
on the issue54 makes the use of these indicators challenging.  
 
In interpreting article 2(1), perhaps even more central is the question of how to interpret the 
term progressive realisation. The usage of terms full realization and progressive 
achievements implies that the drafting parties have acknowledged that the full realisation of 
                                                        
48 The ICJ has noted in its case law that ”[t]o warrant an interpretation other than that which ensues 
from the natural meaning of the words, a decisive reason would be required”. See Conditions of 
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), (Advisory 
Opinion) (1948) ICJ Rep 57, 63. 
49  Alston and Quinn 1987, 186-92. See, however, eg Coomans, Fons and Kamminga, Menno: 
‘Comparative Introductory Comments on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties’ 
in Coomans, Fons and Kamminga, Menno (eds): Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (Intersentia 2004), 2 and Skogly, Sigrun: Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights 
Obligations in International Cooperation (Intersentia, 2006), 83-98. The authors argue that the 
ICESCR creates extraterritorial obligations. 
50 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) (2004) ICJ Rep 136, para 112. 
51 See Ssenyonjo 2009, 60-1. 
52 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Philippines’, (7 June 1995) UN Doc E/C.12/1995/7, paras 21 
and 24 and CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Senegal’ (24 September 2001) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1/Add.62, paras 23 and 45. 
53 Ssenyonjo 2009, 61. 
54 Craven 1995, 4 and 10. 
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rights cannot be achieved in a short period of time.55 Whilst the ultimate result that has to be 
achieved is left somewhat open, article 2(1) creates an obligation not to stop the realisation 
of rights at any given level but rather to aim at the continuous improvement.56 The question 
is not, therefore, merely about the result that must be achieved but also about the desired 
conduct, i.e. the continuing measures that need to be taken. 
 
In academic debate it has indeed been argued that two kinds of obligations can be derived 
from article 2(1); namely obligations of conduct and obligations of result.57 Legal experts 
have upheld this view during the drafting of Maastrich Guidelines in 1997.58 According to 
the ILC, an obligation of conduct is an obligation where the state is obliged to undertake a 
certain course of conduct, whether through an act or omission. Here the conduct itself would 
be the goal. An obligation of result, instead, requires a state to achieve a specific result whilst 
the form of conduct is left to state discretion. 59  Article 2(1) of the ICESCR has been 
described as a mixture of these two types of obligations.60 This does seem accurate, as the 
obligation to progressively achieve the full realisation of the rights is indeed mostly an 
obligation of conduct, whereas the substantive articles of the ICESCR set various obligations 
of result when read together with article 2(1). 
 
To summarise, two different obligations derive from article 2(1) the ICESCR: first, the 
principle of progressive realisation imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the full realisation of the rights provided for in the ICESCR, 
highlighting the importance of improvement and advancement when it comes to the 
realisation of social rights.61 In addition to this positive obligation, the article also entails a 
negative obligation, namely the prohibition of retrogression. The prohibition of retrogression 
means that when a state becomes a party to the ICESCR, it assumes an obligation to refrain 
from lowering the level of protection of the respective social rights. Any retrogressive 
                                                        
55 CESCR, ‘General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the 
Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN Doc E/1991/23, para 9. 
56 See eg Craven 1995, 128-9. 
57 See eg Ssenyonjo 2009, 22. 
58 Maastricht Guidelines, paras 6 and 7. 
59 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session’ (23 April–
1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 123-33. 
60 Alston and Quinn 1987, 165. See also Craven 1995 107-9. 
61 CESCR General Comment 3, para 9. 
  16 
 
 
measures can only be taken in accordance with the limitations set out under the ICESCR.62 
The interrelationship between these two principles shall be further explored in the next 
chapter.  
 
2.3 THREE LEVELS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
Realisation of positive rights can be said to consist of three different levels. First, the lowest 
level entails realisation of the minimum core content of each right. Each substantive social 
right has a so-called minimum core content. The CESCR has outlined that the ratio of the 
minimum core obligation is to “ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights”.63 It follows that the lack of sufficient resources cannot 
be a justification for any state in not meeting this obligation.64 The minimum core obligation, 
however, is not a static threshold but rather an evolving one; it might be that a certain level 
of implementation, once above this baseline, is not sufficient after the economic situation in 
a particular state has improved in time.65 One of the practical difficulties, as noted in the 
academic discussion on the topic, is that defining the content of the minimum core obligation 
of each substantive right is challenging.66 It must be noted that the domestic threshold of the 
minimum core content of social rights may be higher than the threshold under international 
law; even if the state manages to meet the requirements deriving from the international 
human rights obligations, the level of realisation is not necessarily in compliance with the 
domestic standards for the realisation of social rights. 
 
Secondly, the principle of non-regression operates between the minimum core obligation 
and the current level of rights. The minimum core obligation is the lowest threshold below 
which a state can in no circumstances fall, whereas the principle of non-regression prevents 
a state from taking any unnecessary regressive steps even after the threshold of the minimum 
                                                        
62 Nolan and others 2014, 123. 
63 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10. 
64  D Turk, Second Progress Report of UN Special Rapporteur on ESCR, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para 10. 
65  See Bilchitz, David: ‘Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the 
Foundations for the Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 1, 13-14. 
66 Rautiainen 2013, 269. 
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core obligation has been reached.67 The second level is thus the current level of rights, 
although a state is under an obligation to seek to progressively raise the level of rights above 
that threshold. The third level is the imaginary “perfect” level of rights, towards which the 
state should constantly aim in the implementation of social rights. Therefore, the principle 
of progressive realisation can be seen to operate between the second and the third level of 
rights. 
 
 
Acknowledging the existence of these thresholds is necessary in order to understand the 
context in which the principle of non-regression operates. Of further interest is the specific 
content of the obligation not to take any unnecessary regressive steps. Due to the reticent 
approach of the CESCR and the ECSR to the definition and limits of the principle of non-
regression, it is necessary to have recourse to the decisions and statements of international, 
regional and domestic judicial organs in order to define the limits of the principle in a 
satisfactory manner. In other words, we can ensure the accurate application of the principles 
of progressive realisation and non-regression and, consequently, the effective enjoyment of 
                                                        
67 Bilchitz 2003, 12. See also Coomans, Fons: ‘In Search of the Core Content of the Right to 
Education’, in Chapman, Audrey and Russell, Sage (eds): Core Obligations: Building a Framework 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2002), 228. 
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social rights only by defining the practical content of the principle of non-regression.68 The 
scope of the minimum core obligation shall be further discussed in Chapter Three, as one of 
the cumulative conditions of the prohibition of retrogression can be argued to be the 
protection of the minimum core content of each substantive right. 
The purpose of the next chapter is to find how judicial organs and experts have defined the 
content of the principle of non-regression. This serves the purposes of Part II of the thesis, 
as by defining the legal principle governing the limitation of social rights, one can evaluate 
whether the Finnish system of human rights review makes it possible to take the principle 
into account. As the CESCR is the main authority monitoring the implementation of the 
ICESCR by the state parties, I will examine its statements on the issue. Moreover, the 
statements of the European regional judicial bodies, in particular the ECSR and the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (‘FRA’), are of great importance.  
                                                        
68 Nolan and others 2014, 132. The authors point out that also the normative content of the principle 
remains to be unclear. 
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3. PROHIBITION OF RETROGRESSION 
 
3.1 CHALLENGES IN DEFINING AND APPLYING THE PROHIBITION OF 
RETROGRESSION 
The CESCR has stated that “any deliberately retrogressive measures […] would require the 
most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of 
the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources”.69  In other words, progressive realisation does not mean that the social 
rights are to be deprived of any meaningful content. This is further evidenced by the general 
objective of the ICESCR, namely in establishing obligations for States Parties with regards 
to the full realisation of the social rights in question.70 It is evident that article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR and article 12(3) of the ESC impose certain requirements that states need to take 
into account when they are deciding on measures that might have a regressive impact on the 
realisation of positive rights. The precise content of those requirements has, nevertheless, 
remained somewhat unclear; leaving not only the theoretical concept but also the practical 
application of the doctrine open to interpretation.71 
Moreover, regardless of the specific requirements of the principle, the assessment of any 
alleged breach is in any event remarkably challenging. This is due to the fact that the 
prohibition of retrogression contains two dimensions: a normative and an empirical 
dimension.  With regards to the normative dimension, we refer to any legal, de jure steps 
backwards; the empirical dimension concerns the de facto backsliding in the effective 
enjoyment of the rights. Assessing whether a state has failed to comply with the latter 
                                                        
69 CESCR General Comment 3, para 9. 
70 Nolan and others 2014, 122. 
71 ibid, 121. 
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dimension would require a comprehensive analysis of the state conduct and a wide range of 
various quantitative indicators, which unfortunately are not always available, as states do 
not systematically collect such data.72 In Part II of the thesis, it will be submitted that the so-
called proactive models for monitoring the realisation of social rights would be the most 
effective in monitoring the empirical dimension of the prohibition of retrogression. Proactive 
models require constant participation of all public authorities in the implementation and 
monitoring process. Consequently, the prohibition of retrogression would be taken into 
account as one element of constant human rights impact assessment by public authorities.73 
Another factor that makes assessing the existence of a breach demanding is the fact that 
different states value and ascribe to different schools of economic thought. This is to say that 
competing economic ideologies have different views for instance on the role of the public 
sector and fiscal policies. Therefore, while a neo-classical school of thought would adopt 
lower wages to increase the competitiveness of national firms on the global market and thus 
the domestic employment rate,74 neo-Keynesian schools of thought would guarantee the 
existing labour conditions and wages to ensure a high enough demand for goods and services 
from consumers, driving economic growth and job creation.75 These economic questions are 
ultimately irresolvable disputes and one cannot name the best option with sufficient 
empirical certainty. As one cannot decisively find that following another school of thought 
would have led to a more acceptable result, international judicial bodies have been reticent 
to enter into these discussions. This, of course, has not in any way clarified the content of 
the prohibition of retrogression, particularly in its empirical dimension at times of an 
economic crisis. 
With that said, it must be noted that it is not necessary, or even advisable, to have too 
stringent a set of conditions to make the application of the prohibition of retrogression 
efficient. In fact, it might be that too strict and narrow a definition of the principle could lead 
to a situation where a particular state would not base its decisions on the special features of 
                                                        
72  Nolan and others 2014, 123-4. See also Center for Economic and Social Rights, ‘OPERA: 
Assessing Compliance with the Obligation to Fulfill Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 
and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Indicators: 
A Guide to Measurement and Implementation’ (2012). 
73 See Fredman 2008, 189-92. 
74 See eg Nolan and others 2014, 128-9  
75 ibid. On measures taken to tackle unemployment in various EU member states, see FRA 2010, 11-
13. 
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the case at hand nor adjust its decision-making in an advisable manner. In that sense a 
definition of the prohibition incorporating a sufficient degree of flexibility may also be 
necessary in order to avoid a negative impact upon the realisation of social rights.76 
I argue that while article 2(1) of the ICESCR or article 12(3) of the ESC do not contain any 
strict guidelines for the limitation of the recognised rights, they nevertheless entail certain 
similar criteria that must be considered and respected by a state when it seeks to limit social 
rights.77 This can be seen, first of all, from the statements and observations given by the 
CESCR and decisions of the ECSR during the current economic crisis.  
Until recently, the CESCR has been reluctant to clarify the content of the principle of 
retrogression. As noted above, this can be explained by the fact that evaluating whether a 
particular legislative measure de facto is a retrogressive measure is particularly 
challenging.78 However, in the statement concerning the obligation to take steps to the 
maximum of available resources in May 2007 the CESCR listed a set of parameters for 
evaluating whether the limitation of social rights has been justified and in accordance with 
the object and purpose of the ICESCR, namely the effective protection of human rights.79 
These criteria seek to take into account the country’s level of development; the severity of 
the alleged breach and its effect on the minimum core content of the respective right; the 
current economic situation of the country and any impacts of economic recession; limited 
resources of the country, resulting, for example, from a recent natural disaster or an armed 
conflict; whether the state has explored the possibility to resort to low-cost options; and 
whether the state has asked for cooperation and assistance or rejected offers of resources 
from the international community without sufficient reason.80 These so-called objective 
criteria operate as guidelines when assessing the legitimacy of any regressive measures. 
In addition to that, in their Letter to States Parties dated 16 May 2012 the CESCR, for the 
first time, gave a series of requirements that should be met when limiting rights recognised 
in the ICESCR. One can of course contest the binding nature of that letter, particularly as 
                                                        
76 Nolan and others 2014, 130-1. 
77 See Craven 1995, 26-7. Craven argues that the drafters of the ICESCR considered article 2(1) to 
be flexible enough to allow the lack of any specific derogation clause. 
78 Nolan and others 2014, 126-7. 
79 Ssenyonjo 2009, 51. 
80 CESCR: ‘An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to the “Maximum of available resources” 
under an optional protocol to the Covenant’ (1 May 2007) UN Doc E/C.12/2007/1, para 8.  
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the words retrogressive measures have not been expressly mentioned in the wording of this 
instrument. Whilst the legal status of this letter remains unclear and potentially non-binding, 
even as a soft law instrument, recent statements by the CESCR and various cases in domestic 
courts continue to suggest that the international community has been willing to recognise 
the binding nature of these conditions.81  
Further, article 12(3) of the ESC entails the obligation to raise progressively the system of 
social security to a higher level, and, consequently, not to take any unnecessary regressive 
steps. The ECSR has pointed out that not all reductions automatically constitute a violation 
of article 12(3) of the ESC. Rather, it has concluded that “the pursuit of economic goals is 
not incompatible with article 12”. According to the ECSR, certain regressive measures may 
be needed to safeguard the social security system at the time of economic recession.82  The 
ECSR has in its recent decisions sought to clarify, at least to some extent, when a regressive 
measure could be justified. 
The CESCR and the ECSR are the supervisory bodies of the two main instruments for the 
international protection of social rights, namely the ICESCR and the ESC. As noted, these 
instruments are also binding in Finland. By looking into the statements and decisions by 
these two bodies, one can derive certain requirements that have been frequently mentioned 
when discussing the legitimacy of any limitations upon social rights. In the subsequent 
chapters, it will be demonstrated that the requirements mentioned by the CESCR in the letter 
of May 2012 have also been applied by domestic courts, by the ECSR and by the CESCR 
itself in its concluding observations and other statements. This means that the requirements 
have been accepted by domestic and international levels as applicable guidelines for the 
limitation of social rights and, as such, form the conditions of the principle of non-regression. 
The conditions which will be examined next are as follows: 
1) the limitation should be temporary;  
2) the limitation should be necessary and proportionate;  
3) the limitation should not be discriminatory; and 
                                                        
81 Nolan and others 2014, 138. Generally on the nature of soft law norms, see Thürer, Daniel: ’Soft 
Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed): The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online 
ed). 
82 Pensioners’ Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) v Greece (7 December 2012) ECSR 
80/2012 (hereinafter “ECSR 80/2012”), para 66. 
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4) the state must at all times identify and protect the minimum core obligation of the right 
in question.83  
3.2 THE REQUIREMENT OF IMPERMANENCE   
 
Judging from the statements by international judicial organs and case law of domestic 
constitutional courts, the conditions of the principle of non-regression are cumulative.84 This 
means that each and every one of them must be fulfilled in order to lawfully limit social 
rights. The first of these criteria is the requirement that the limitation of a right be temporary. 
 
At the international level, both the CESCR and the ECSR have listed the temporary character 
of limitations as one of the conditions of the principle of non-regression. Indeed, the CESCR 
itself has started to apply the conditions outlined in the 2012 Letter to State Parties. It has 
stated in several concluding observations on states’ periodic reports that austerity measures 
should in all cases be temporary.85 This evidences that the CESCR does not consider the 
principle of non-regression merely as a soft-law instrument. Moreover, the ECSR has held 
in its decision concerning the level of social security in Greece that reduction in the level of 
pensioners’ social security was incompatible with article 12(3) of the ESC. One reason for 
the finding of the ECSR was the fact that the regressive legislation did not entail any 
provisions on the provisional application of the act; in other words that the regressive 
measure was not meant to be temporary.86  
The requirement has also been mentioned and applied in various domestic cases concerning 
the principle of non-regression. For the purposes of this thesis, two cases are of particular 
relevance; the so-called Latvian Pensions Case87 and the case concerning the legality of 
                                                        
83 CESCR, ’Letter from CESCR Chairperson to States Parties in the context of the economic and 
financial crisis’ (16 May 2012) UN Doc CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW. 
84 See eg Constitutional Court of Latvia, (21 December 2009) Case No 2009–43–01 (hereinafter 
“Latvian Pensions Case”), para 28. 
85 See eg CESCR ‘Concluding Observations on Spain’ (6 June 2012) UN Doc E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, 
para 17 and CESCR ‘Concluding Observations on Iceland’ (11 December 2012) UN Doc 
E/C.12/ISL/CO/4, para 6 
86 ECSR 80/2012, paras 56 and 73. 
87 Constitutional Court of Latvia, (21 December 2009) Case No 2009–43–01. 
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Portuguese State Budget Law 88 . Both of these cases were heard by the respective 
constitutional courts. The Latvian Constitutional Court found that the temporary nature of 
the limitation is indeed necessary for a limitation to be justified. In that particular case the 
reduction of pensions was planned to be temporary, but the constitutional court found that 
the Latvian legislator had failed to meet other cumulative conditions.89  
 
In the Portuguese Budget Law Case, the Constitutional Court of Portugal had to consider the 
legality of several budget-related austerity measures, including reductions in public salaries 
and pensions. Whilst the court found that in many respects the requirements of justified 
limitation had not been met, it held that since the reduction in sickness and unemployment 
benefits were imposed only for one year at a time, the limitation was in accordance with the 
requirement of impermanence.90  What is essential for the purposes of this thesis is the fact 
that, in this particular case, the temporary nature of the limitation was considered as one of 
the cumulative conditions when limiting social rights. 
In Finland, the condition of impermanence is a cumulative condition that must be met when 
limiting fundamental rights at a time of emergency. 91  The Finnish Constitutional Law 
Committee has also noted that a temporary freezing of index increments of child allowance 
was not unconstitutional.92 The reasoning of the Committee has, however, been criticised as 
not sufficiently examining the effects on the most vulnerable groups, i.e. families with young 
children.93 
3.3 THE REQUIREMENT OF NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 
The second condition under the prohibition of non-regression might be argued to be that a 
limitation must be necessary and proportionate.  Even in situations of resource scarcity, 
fiscal discipline or savings, the state must be able to demonstrate the necessity of the 
measures taken. Looking at the statements given by the CESCR, this requirement means that 
                                                        
88  Constitutional Court of Portugal, (5 April 2013) Judgment No 187/2013, English summary 
(hereinafter ‘Portuguese Budget Law Case’). The English summary available at 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/acordaos/20130187s.html (accessed 23 August 2015). 
89 Latvian Pensions Case, para 32. 
90 Portuguese Budget Law Case, English summary, chapter 3. 
91 See Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 309/1993 vp, chapter 3.5. 
92 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 25/2012 vp. 
93 Rautiainen 2013, 273. 
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the measures must have been necessary for the protection of the totality of the rights provided 
for in the ICESCR.94  The burden of proof to demonstrate that the measures have been 
necessary and proportionate lies upon the state in question: The CESCR has on several 
occasions noted that the state must prove the strict necessity of the measure.95 During the 
drafting of Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a 
group of legal experts found that the burden of proof is upon the state to show that it is 
making measurable progress toward the full realisation of the rights in question or that it is 
unable to carry out its obligation for reasons beyond its control. 96  The condition of 
proportionality means that “the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be 
more detrimental to economic, social and cultural rights”.97  In other words, the test is 
whether there would have been any less restrictive but yet effective measures available for 
the state at that point. Needless to say, assessing whether this condition has been met is 
extremely challenging due to the empirical difficulties in monitoring, as demonstrated above 
in Chapter Two.  
 
Furthermore, the ECSR has highlighted that any regressive measures must have a legitimate 
aim. A regressive measure is compatible with the principle of non-regression, as established 
in article 12(3) of the ESC, when it is necessary to ensure the stability of the system of social 
security. According to the ECSR, a regressive measure cannot prevent individuals from 
enjoying the effective protection against social and economic risks.98 
 
                                                        
94 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9; see also Nolan and others 2014, 134. 
95  CESCR, ‘General Comment No 13: The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant)’ (8 
December 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10, para 45; CESCR, ‘General Comment No 14: The right to 
the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, para 32; CESCR, ‘General 
Comment No 18: The Right to Work (Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights)’ (6 February 2006) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18, para 21; CESCR, ‘General 
Comment No 19: The right to social security (art. 9)’ (4 February 2008) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/19, para 
42; CESCR, ‘General Comment No 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 
1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (21 December 2009) 
UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21, para 65; CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the 
“Maximum of Available Resources Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (21 September 
2007) UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1, para 9. 
96 Maastricht Guidelines, paras 8 and 13. 
97 CESCR, ’Letter from CESCR Chairperson to States Parties in the context of the economic and 
financial crisis’, 2. 
98 ECSR 80/2012, para 66. 
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After the outburst of the economic crisis in 2008, several European constitutional courts 
have been forced to assess the fulfilment of this prerequisite. Both in the Latvian Pensions 
Case and in the Portuguese Budget Law Case, the constitutional court found that the 
measures taken did not pass the test of necessity and proportionality. In order to elaborate 
upon the content of this condition, these considerations shall be further discussed below.  
 
In the Latvian Pensions Case the court held, inter alia, that the state had not considered other 
less restrictive options.99 The court first highlighted that the economic situation of a state 
cannot serve as an overarching justification to lower the already existing level of social 
rights, but rather, the state needs to have other legitimate ends for its restrictive actions. 
Secondly, it held that the reduction of pensions did have a legitimate end; that being the 
secured sustainability of the social insurance budget which supports societal welfare.100 The 
court did not, however, find that the measure chosen by the Latvian legislator would have 
been proportionate. In its reasoning the court listed three criteria to examine whether the 
measures taken had been proportionate: it noted that the means used by the legislator should 
be appropriate for achieving the legitimate end; the action could not have been achieved by 
other, less restrictive means; and the benefit for society should be more significant than the 
detriment to the rights of the individual.101 Whilst it could be argued that the reduction of 
pensions had a legitimate end, the court found that the legislator had not considered with 
sufficient care the alternatives to the impugned provisions and had not envisaged a more 
lenient solution. Consequently, the court was unable to find that the criterion of 
proportionality had been met.102  
It must be noted that in the case at hand the court derived the content of the rule partly from 
its earlier case law and the Latvian Constitution. This does not mean, however, that 
international law was without relevance. The court expressly referred to the ICESCR and 
noted that the international human rights regulations and practice serve as interpretative 
means for determining the nature and scope of the principles of judicial state and 
fundamental rights.103 Also, the Latvian Constitution states that the state shall recognise and 
                                                        
99 Latvian Pensions Case, para 31. 
100 ibid, para 27.2. 
101 ibid, para 28. 
102 ibid, para 30.2. 
103 ibid, para 20. 
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protect fundamental human rights in accordance with the Constitution, laws and 
international agreements binding upon Latvia.104 
In the Portuguese Budget Law Case, the Constitutional Court of Portugal held that the norm 
which provided for a contribution payable on unemployment and sickness benefits was 
unconstitutional because it violated the principle of proportionality. The court found that the 
principle of proportionality had been violated because the legislation made it possible for 
the amount of sickness and unemployment benefits to fall below the minimum level of 
benefits already established in the legislation.  The court linked the disproportionality with 
the fact that these kinds of situations would affect the rights of the most vulnerable groups.105  
Two notions can be derived from the reasoning of the constitutional courts. First, one 
essential question to be answered when assessing the proportionality of restrictive measures 
seems to be whether the legislator has carried out sufficient consideration of alternative 
measures prior to taking action. This, of course, is an imperative part of good governance 
and, as such, logically one of the elements when assessing whether the actions of the 
legislator have been reasonable in this context. The fact that a state has not considered 
alternative measures usually indicates that other, less restrictive options could have been 
available for the legislator. Secondly, if the limitation of social rights is discriminatory or 
fails to protect the most vulnerable groups, it also usually fails to pass the test of necessity 
and proportionality.  
3.4 THE REQUIREMENT OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
 
Third condition of the prohibition of retrogression can be argued to be that the regressive 
measure cannot be discriminatory. This is to say that it should be neither directly nor 
indirectly discriminatory and it should, in particular, take into account the rights of 
disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups and ensure that they are not 
disproportionately affected by the regressive measure. 106  It is a responsibility of a 
democratic constitutional state to ensure that the effects of austerity measures do not impair 
the effective enjoyment of the rights of the most vulnerable groups.107 The ratio of this 
                                                        
104 ibid, para 20. See Latvian Constitution, section 89. 
105 Portuguese Budget Law case, English summary, chapter 3. 
106 Nolan and others 2014, 140. 
107 Rautiainen 2013, 272. 
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condition appears to go hand in hand with the general objective of economic, social and 
cultural rights; namely the promotion of equality in society.  
The importance of this particular condition has been widely recognised by the international 
community. The FRA has in several occasions highlighted that austerity measures during 
the current economic crisis should seek to secure the rights of the most vulnerable groups.108 
The main reason for this is to avoid the increase of socio-economic inequalities in society, 
as the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged groups rises in times of crisis.109 Notably, 
recession causes long-term unemployment, which is in turn closely linked to social 
exclusion.110  
This condition has been recently discussed by the ECSR in its decisions concerning the 
legality of the austerity measures in Greece. The FRA noted already in 2010 that the Stability 
and Growth Pact, through which the EU sets certain restrictions on the use of fiscal policy 
by each Member State, might have an adverse impact on vulnerable groups.111 Due to the 
situation of excessive deficit in Greece, the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund - the so-called Troika - agreed in 2010 on a 
financial support mechanism with the Greek government. According to this agreement, 
Greece was obligated to take measures ”towards the correction of the excessive deficit”. 
These measures included, inter alia, several modifications to pensioners’ social protection.112 
The implementation of those measures in Greece led to a series of collective complaints to 
the ECSR by Greek pensioners’ unions. These five complaints concerned the same facts and 
in each of the cases the ECSR found a violation of article 12(3) of the 1961 European Social 
Charter (‘1961 Charter’). 113  As article 12(3) of the 1969 Charter concerns state party 
                                                        
108 FRA 2010, 14 and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘The European Union as a 
Community of values: safeguarding fundamental rights in times of crisis’ (2013), 14-7. 
109 FRA 2013, 12. 
110  European Commission, Directorate‐General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012’ (8 January 2013), 3. 
111 FRA 2010, 37-40. 
112  Council Decision (EU) 2010/182/EU of 16 February 2010 giving notice for Greece to take 
measures for the deficit reduction judged to be necessary in order to remedy the situation of excessive 
deficit (2010) OJ L83/13. 
113 European Social Charter of 1961 (adopted 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 February 1965) 
CETS 035; Federation of employed pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v Greece (7 December 2012) 
ECSR 76/2012, para 78; Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners (POPS) v Greece (7 
December 2012) ECSR 77/2012, para 78; Pensioners’ Union of the Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways 
(I.S.A.P.) v Greece (7 December 2012) ECSR 78/2012, para 78; Panhellenic Federation of 
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obligations “to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher 
level”, the ECSR was required to discuss the justified limitations of social rights under the 
1961 Charter.114 
According to article 31(1) of the 1969 Charter the rights guaranteed under the charter “shall 
not be subject to any restrictions or limitations not specified in [the charter], except such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public 
health, or morals”. The ECSR based its considerations concerning the legality of the 
regressive measures on the interpretation of article 31. For the purposes of this thesis these 
decisions of the ECSR are of relevance, as the Revised ESC is binding and applicable in the 
Finnish constitutional context and its article G is identical to article 31 of the 1961 Charter.115 
Also, the considerations of the ECSR can be argued to more generally cast light on the 
content of this criterion.  
The ECSR found that the fact that Greece had made agreements on the implementation of 
certain austerity measures with the Troika was not a justification for their non-compliance 
with other international obligations, i.e. the obligations of Greece under the 1961 Charter.116 
Furthermore, it concluded that Greece had not made sufficient efforts to maintain a 
satisfactory level of protection for the benefit of the most vulnerable members of society. 
Here, also, one of the most important reasons for this finding was that the government had 
not conducted a minimum-level of research and analysis into the impacts of the measures on 
vulnerable groups. The CESR found that the government should have explored other options 
and so limited the restrictive effect of the measures.117  
                                                        
pensioners of the Public Electricity Corporation (POS-DEI) v Greece (7 December 2012) ECSR 
79/2012, para 78 and ECSR 80/2012, paras 7 and 78. 
114 Article 12(3) of the Revised ESC is identical to its predecessor. 
115  See Tasavallan presidentin asetus uudistetun Euroopan sosiaalisen peruskirjan 
voimaansaattamisesta ja uudistetun Euroopan sosiaalisen peruskirjan lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien 
määräysten voimaansaattamisesta annetun lain voimaantulosta sekä Euroopan sosiaalisen 
peruskirjan ja siihen liittyvän lisäpöytäkirjan eräiden määräysten hyväksymisestä annetun lain 
kumoamisesta annetun lain voimaantulosta (80/2002 26.7.2002).  
116 See eg ECSR 80/2012, para 46. 
117 ECSR 80/2012, paras 73-6. See also General Federation of employees of the national electric 
power corporation (GENOP‐DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil Servants’ Trade Unions 
(ADEDY) v Greece (23 May 2012) ECSR 65/2011, paras 14-9. 
  30 
 
 
The Council of Europe and its institutions have also on other occasions highlighted that the 
rights of the most vulnerable groups should always be protected when resorting to regressive 
measures. The Committee of Ministers has noted that any austerity measures should be 
evaluated in the light of the objective to prevent poverty.118 Furthermore, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in its resolution on austerity measures called on the 
member states of the Council of Europe to “closely assess current austerity programmes 
from the view-point of their short- and long-term impact on democratic decision-making 
processes and social rights standards, social security systems and social services [...] to the 
most vulnerable groups”.119  
As for the domestic case law during the current economic crisis, the constitutional courts of 
Latvia120, Portugal121 and Germany122 have all found that regressive legislative measures 
have not been justified as the legislator has failed to protect the most vulnerable groups and 
to target the measures in an equitable manner. The conditions of proportionality and non-
discrimination are, indeed, closely linked with each other. It can hardly be argued that an 
austerity measure targeted at the most vulnerable groups in society could be the best option 
available even at the time of a fiscal crisis. This holds true also in cases where the measures 
taken have had an indirect negative impact on the most disadvantaged groups. Consequently, 
if the legislator fails to meet this condition when limiting social rights, it is also highly likely 
that the condition of necessity and proportionality has not been met. 
In Finnish constitutional discourse it has been underlined that the justification of regressive 
measures should always be more difficult where they touch the rights of the most 
vulnerable.123 This is indeed true, especially when it would be possible to resort to other 
measures; the budgetary impact of which would be as beneficial whilst the human rights 
impact would be minimised. The actions of a welfare state should always reduce the 
                                                        
118 ECSR 80/2012, para 29. 
119 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Austerity measures – a danger for democracy 
and social rights'. (26 June 2012) Res 1884 (2012), paras 10(3) and 10(6). 
120 Latvian Pensions Case 2009, para 32. 
121 Constitutional Court of Portugal, (5 July 2012) Judgment No 353/2012, English summary. The 
English summary available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/acordaos/20120353s.html 
(accessed 24 August 2015). 
122 Constitutional Court of Germany, 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 3/09, 1 BvL 4/09 (9  February 2010), paras 
208-9. 
123 See eg Scheinin, Martin: ’Sosiaaliset perusoikeudet ja lainsäätäjä’ (1995) 24 Oikeus 343. 
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inequality in the society, thus diminish economic and social differences between individuals 
and various groups. 
Finally, while discriminatory measures or measures that increase inequality cannot be 
considered appropriate, regressive measures can be justified when they benefit the most 
vulnerable groups.124 In other words, austerity measures are urged to be targeted so that they 
would increase equality and improve the realisation of social rights of the most vulnerable 
groups.125  According to the FRA reports, European states have sought to target austerity 
measures so that the limited resources would be channelled at those most in need. Assessing 
whether this channelling has been successful and whether the minimum level of social 
protection is de facto being maintained is, however, challenging.126 
3.5 THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATION OF 
THE RIGHT IN QUESTION 
 
As noted above in Chapter Two, protecting the minimum core obligation of the right in 
question can be listed as one of the prerequisites of the limitation of social rights. Protecting 
the minimum core obligation means that a regressive measure cannot defeat the most 
essential content; the ratio of the right in question. The minimum core content is the non-
negotiable, fundamental part of the right. All individuals are always, in all circumstances, 
entitled to the minimum core content of the right.127  
It must be noted also in this context that there is a difference between the international 
minimum core obligation and the Finnish, domestic minimum core obligation.128 While the 
international minimum core obligation operates as the ultimate threshold, below which the 
state can never go, the domestic minimum core obligation may be higher. Nothing prevents 
a state from adopting higher minimum standards in its constitution and domestic system, for 
as long as the international requirements are met. For the purposes of part one of the thesis, 
when one examines the prohibition of retrogression and its conditions under international 
                                                        
124 See eg Elson, Diane, Balakrishnan, Radhika and Heintz, James: ‘Public Finance, Maximum 
Available Resources and Human Rights’ in Nolan, Aoife, O’Connell, Rory and Harvey, Colin (eds): 
Human Rights and Public Finance (Hart Publishing 2013), 23. 
125 Limburg principles, paras 13-14 and Maastricht Guidelines, para 14(d). 
126 On the measures taken in certain European countries in 2009, see FRA 2010, 25-9. 
127 CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10. 
128 Rautiainen 2013, 267-8. 
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law, it is indeed the former threshold that is of relevance. In the Finnish context, however, 
the domestic minimum threshold needs to be respected. The international minimum core 
obligation of social rights has been determined generally by ”having regard to the needs of 
the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the right in question”.129 
The CESCR has in its statements pointed out that the adoption of any retrogressive measures 
incompatible with the core obligations under the ICESCR would not be permissible.130 
Defining the core elements and the minimum core obligation of each social right is not 
necessarily always an easy task. The CESCR has, however, noted that when it comes to the 
right to social security, the minimum essential level of benefits means that all individuals 
and families are able to acquire at least essential health care,
 
basic shelter and housing, water 
and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most basic forms of education.131 In Europe, citizens 
generally enjoy access to these minimum essential level of social rights.132 With that being 
said, the minimum core obligation of a right is, as pointed out above in chapter two, an 
evolving threshold. Therefore it can be argued that the threshold of minimum core obligation 
in the European welfare states is higher than in some less developed countries, simply 
because of differences in the amount of available resources. 
As for the legal practice of the ECSR, the Committee has recently examined whether Finland 
had violated article 12(3) of the ESC by failing to improve the social security system in an 
adequate manner. Whilst the ECSR did not eventually find a violation of article 12(3), in 
assessing the issue it held that changes to any social security system must ensure “the 
maintenance of a basic compulsory social security system which is sufficiently extensive”.133 
Moreover, the former President of the ECSR noted in his separate concurring opinion on the 
decision that the inadequate level of social security in terms of article 12(1) of the ESC 
makes it difficult to demonstrate adequate progress in terms of article 12(3) of the ESC.134 I 
                                                        
129 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Government of South Africa v Grootboom (4 October 2000) 
CCT 11/00, para 31. See also Ssenyonjo 2009, 66. 
130 General Comment 19, para 64; CESCR General Comment 14, para 48. 
131 CESCR General Comment 19, para 59(a). 
132 O’Cinneide 2014, 169.  
133 Finnish Society of Social Rights v Finland (9 September 2014) ECSR 88/2012, para 85. The 
ECSR did find violations of articles 12(1) and 13(1) of the ESC. 
134 Separate Concurring Opinion of Luis Jimena Quesada (9 September 2014) ECSR 88/2012, para 
9. 
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will further discuss the relevance of the particular case in the Finnish context in Part II of 
the thesis. 
 
Moreover, domestic constitutional courts have discussed the specific content of this 
condition. In the Latvian Pensions Case, the court held that even in a situation of rapid 
economic recession there is still a minimum body of rights that a state is not entitled to 
derogate from, i.e. the minimum core content of the social right in question.135 In this context 
the court also referred to the CESCR’s statement, according to which a state should specify 
the groups that need special protection in situations where it is incapable of ensuring the 
minimum level of protection to all the risk groups.136 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
of Germany has found that for a measure to be reasonable, the minimum standard of rights 
that is in line with human dignity must be secured. Interestingly, the court held that the exact 
amount of state benefits should be calculated in a manner compatible with human dignity.137 
This implies that in assessing whether a regressive measure has de facto affected the 
minimum level of rights, the principle of human dignity should operate as a guideline. 
The underlying idea of this condition is that the minimum subsistence rights for all should 
always be ensured by states, regardless of the resources available and the level of economic 
development.138 The question remains, however, as to what a state is required to do in 
situations where its own resources are not sufficient for securing the minimum level of 
rights. While it is evident that international cooperation would be necessary in those cases, 
the specific content of the obligation to cooperate remains unclear, as noted in Chapter Two. 
3.6 LEGAL NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION OF RETROGRESSION: A RULE OR A 
PRINCIPLE? 
It has been presented above that the principle of non-regression consists of a series of 
cumulative criteria that must be met when limiting social rights. The question remains, 
                                                        
135 Latvian Pensions case, para 31. See also ECSR 80/2012, paras 68-9, where the ECSR discussed 
the minimum level of pensions under the ESC. 
136 CESCR General Comment 19, para 59. 
137 Constitutional Court of Germany, 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 3/09, 1 BvL 4/09 (9  February 2010), para 
44. See also O’Cinneide 2014, 174-5. O’Cinneide notes that regressive measures which are 
incompatible with human dignity may be argued to clash with the ‘social state’ principle. 
138 ‘Realization of economic, social and cultural rights: Second progress report prepared by Mr. 
Danilo Türk, Special Rapporteur’ (18 July 1991) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17, para 10. See also 
CESCR, General Comment 3, para 10 and Limburg principles, para 25. 
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however, what is the nature of the principle as a legal norm? Does it operate more as a 
principle, as its name would suggest, or can it in certain situations have a status of a binding 
rule? 
In legal theory, legal norms have been divided into rules and principles, depending on the 
impact of the norm. More precisely, one should talk about the impact the norm has in an 
individual situation of application: the same norm can in some cases operate as a rule, 
whereas in some other cases it would operate as a principle.139 Alexy has distinguished 
between legal rules and principles by noting that with rules one usually has to make a choice 
either to apply or not to apply the rule, whereas legal principles operate more as 
“optimization requirements” that need to be balanced with other applicable principles in 
situations of a collision. By balancing the principles one can then see, which one should have 
the strongest effect in that particular case.140 Principles are, regardless of their application or 
non-application to particular cases, always in force and an integral part of the legal system.141 
What kind of an impact can the principle of non-regression then have in individual situations 
of application? Prima facie it would seem that the principle of non-regression operates, 
indeed, merely as a principle. The principle of non-regression has not been expressly 
incorporated into any provision, and the specific content of it remains relatively vague. 
Moreover, it is challenging to picture a case where a court should decide whether to apply 
the principle of non-regression or not, as it usually is the legislator who should make these 
decisions. In this sense the principle of non-regression seems to operate as a principle, the 
relevance of which actualises mainly in the work of the legislature. With that said, there are 
some arguments worth mentioning that suggest that the principle of non-regression could, 
in certain situations, operate also as a rule. For the sake of clarity I will refer solely to the 
term prohibition of retrogression in the following presentation. 
As noted, the prohibition of retrogression is, due to its nature, mainly of relevance in the 
work of the legislature. In this context, a human rights norm operates as a rule if it prevents 
                                                        
139  Scheinin, Martin: Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa: valtiosääntöoikeudellinen tutkimus 
kansainvälisten ihmisoikeussopimusten valtionsisäisestä voimassaolosta sekä ihmisoikeus- ja 
perusoikeusnormien sovellettavuudesta Suomen oikeusjärjestyksessä (Suomalainen 
Lakimiesyhdistys 1991), 32-3. 
140 Alexy, Robert: A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 1986), 75-7.  
141 Scheinin 1991, 30. 
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the legislature from passing certain kinds of legislation.142 If we look at the prohibition of 
retrogression, this is exactly how the principle should operate. For instance, if the legislature 
were to choose between two bills, in order to comply with the prohibition of retrogression it 
should choose to pass the one that has less impact on vulnerable groups. In particular, in 
situations where the minimum core content of rights would otherwise be violated, the 
prohibition of retrogression operates as an absolute rule.143 Moreover, the prohibition of 
retrogression could operate as a rule in situations where the Constitutional Law Committee 
would find that a bill could not be passed in the ordinary order of enactment because it was 
not in accordance with the prohibition of retrogression and was therefore unconstitutional.144 
In this sense it can be argued that the prohibition of retrogression can, in individual situations 
of application, operate as a rule rather than as a principle. 
Normally, however, the prohibition of retrogression seems to operate as a principle. This 
means that the prohibition should be balanced against other relevant principles. Again, it is 
the legislature who has to weight the prohibition against principles that may support adopting 
regressive legislation. As demonstrated above, regressive measures can also have a 
justifiable aim and they can be supported by other legal principles, for instance, maintaining 
the stability of the social welfare system. The prohibition of retrogression derives, however, 
from states’ human rights obligations. Human rights and fundamental rights obligations are 
choices of priority as made by the legislature and, consequently, the prohibition of 
retrogression should be regarded as having a relatively strong position in the balancing 
process.145 
In the second part of this thesis, I will examine the operation of the prohibition of 
retrogression in the Finnish system for constitutional review and human rights impact 
assessment.
                                                        
142 See Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 12/1982 vp and Scheinin 1991, 37. 
143 Rautiainen 2013, 267-70. 
144 See Scheinin 1991, 38. 
145 Tuori, Kaarlo: ’Sosiaaliset oikeudet (PL 19 §)’ in Hallberg, Pekka, Karapuu, Heikki, Ojanen, 
Tuomas, Scheinin, Martti, Tuori, Kaarlo and Viljanen, Veli-Pekka (eds): Perusoikeudet (WSOYpro 
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PART II: PROHIBITION OF RETROGRESSION AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS IN FINLAND 
 
 
4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND THE 
PROHIBITION OF RETROGRESSION 
 
4.1 STATUS OF FUNDAMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN FINLAND 
 
In this part of the thesis I will examine the effectiveness of social rights in the Finnish 
constitutional legal context, in particular the operation of the principle of non-regression in 
the Finnish system. In order to find out the relevance of the principle in the Finnish 
legislative process and legal practice, one must first look into the Finnish constitutional law 
culture, in particular to the forms of constitutional review. To understand the current model 
of constitutional review in Finland, the traditional doctrine of constitutional review and 
recent developments of Finnish constitutional law must first be discussed. I will do this in 
four parts: First, I will describe how fundamental and human rights started to take root in 
Finland, enhancing the role of the courts within the realm of constitutional law. Secondly, I 
will introduce the domestic mechanisms for the limitation of fundamental rights. Thirdly, I 
will discuss the Finnish model of constitutional review and, finally, consider whether the 
principle of non-regression could and should be of relevance when the constitutionality of 
legislation is being reviewed.  
 
The development and rise of human rights in 1990s was relatively rapid; Finland became a 
member of the European Council in 1989 and ratified the European Convention on Human 
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Rights 146  (‘ECHR’) in 1990. The comprehensive reform of constitutional rights in the 
Finnish system entered into force on 1 August 1995 (Act No 969/1995) and was largely 
influenced by international human rights treaties. The revised constitution entailed a list of 
fundamental rights, including not only civil and political but also economic, social and 
cultural rights.147 In addition to the material content of constitutional rights, also the process 
governing the protection and monitoring of the constitutional rights has been affected by 
international human rights treaties: the new constitution of Finland entered into force on 1 
March 2000 and contained clauses concerning the protection and effective implementation 
of constitutional rights. Section 22 of the 2000 Constitution provides for the duty of public 
authorities to guarantee the observance of constitutional and human rights. Section 74 
establishes the competence of the Constitutional Law Committee to issue statements on the 
constitutionality of legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as 
well as on their relation to international human rights treaties. 148  The importance of 
international human rights treaties has been recognised also in sections 108 and 109, which 
regulate the duties of the Chancellor of Justice of the Government and the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. Their duties entail, inter alia, monitoring the implementation of fundamental 
rights and human rights.  
 
One major factor in the Finnish history of human rights is Finland’s accession to the 
European Union in 1995. As a result, the Finnish courts were granted the competence to 
review all national law with regards to its compliance with the EU. Moreover, in addition to 
its direct and indirect effect, EU law ought to have primacy over any conflicting domestic 
legislation.149 Since 1995, the number of cases where a Finnish court would have refused to 
apply domestic law due to the primacy of EU law has been relatively low. The explanations 
offered in the academic discussion consider Finnish legislation’s predisposition to harmony 
with EU law from the outset, the vast number of precedents by the European Court of Justice 
and the tendency of Finnish courts to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law to 
                                                        
146  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended) 
(entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5. 
147 Heinonen and Lavapuro 2012, 11. 
148 As will be discussed in chapter 4.3, the Consitutional Law Committee had the competence to 
review constitutionality of bills already before the constitutional reform of 1999. 
149 Craig, Paul and de Búrca, Gráinne: EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press 
2011), 256-67. 
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avoid conflicts.150 Because of these reasons the Finnish courts have been reluctant to directly 
address the question concerning the possible conflict between EU law and the domestic 
system for the protection of fundamental and human rights.151  The Constitutional Law 
Committee has, however, highlighted that the domestic level of protection of constitutional 
rights cannot be lowered because of the implementation of EU law.152 The core idea of the 
Finnish system for the protection of fundamental rights and human rights, social rights 
included, is to establish a level of protection as high as possible. To achieve this goal it is 
necessary to derive the applicable legal norm from various sources, ranging from domestic 
system to EU law and to the international level. These different levels, after all, form one 
consistent system for the protection of these rights.153 In addition, international human rights 
treaties establish only the minimum standard in the domestic implementation of the 
respective rights. According to a generally accepted opinion Finnish authorities should aim 
to offer more extensive protection of those rights.154  
 
Starting from the early 1990s, Finnish courts have become increasingly aware of the 
relevance of human rights norms and treaties and have started to refer to them in their case 
law.155 The Constitutional Law Committee issued an opinion in which it noted that all 
domestic law should be applied in accordance with the human-rights-orientated 
interpretation to avoid conflicts between domestic legislation and international human rights 
treaties.156 The ever-growing number of references to international human rights treaties and 
case law of the monitoring bodies evidences that the role of human rights norms in Finland 
has become more and more important. In tandem with the emergence of fundamental and 
human rights, the traditional forms of constitutional review have also been, to some extent, 
challenged. The forms of constitutional review in Finland shall be further discussed in 
Chapter 4.3. 
 
                                                        
150 Ojanen 2009, 201-3. 
151 Ojanen 2009, 201. 
152 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 25/2001 vp. 
153 This question about legal pluralism in the Finnish constitutional law and human rights culture has 
been further discussed eg in Ojanen, Tuomas: ‘Perusoikeuspluralismi kotimaisessa 
tuomioistuimessa’ (2011) 4 Defensor Legis 442. 
154 Ojanen 2009, 199. 
155 Ojanen 2009, 197-8. 
156 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 2/1990 vp. 
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4.2 LIMITATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN FINLAND 
 
Before proceeding with the forms of constitutional review in the Finnish system, it is 
necessary to give regard to the domestic mechanisms that enable limiting of fundamental 
rights. These mechanisms can be divided into four categories. 
 
First, the limitation of fundamental rights can be based on a provision of the Constitution 
itself, if it provides for a possibility to limit a certain right by an ordinary act. A good 
example of this kind of a provision is section 12(1) of the Constitution, according to which 
everyone has the freedom of expression. Provisions on restrictions relating to pictorial 
programs that are necessary for the protection of children may be laid down by an act.  
 
Secondly, in addition to these kind of provisions, a limitation can be based on section 23 of 
the Constitution, which provides for exceptions to basic rights and liberties in situations of 
emergency. According to section 23, such provisional exceptions to basic rights and liberties 
that are compatible with Finland's international human rights obligations and that are deemed 
necessary, may be provided by an act or by a government decree. The government degree 
must be issued on the basis of authorisation given in an act for a special reason and it is 
subject to a precisely circumscribed scope of application. The grounds for provisional 
exceptions shall, however, be laid down by an act. An exception can be deemed necessary 
in the case of an armed attack against Finland or in the event of other situations of emergency 
that pose a serious threat to the nation. The Constitutional Law Committee has in its 
statement noted that the conditions of this section would be in accordance with the 
derogations clauses in article 2(1) of the ICESCR and in article 30 of the 1961 ESC (article 
F of the Revised Charter). 157 It is, however, somewhat unclear whether times of economic 
recession fall within the definition of a public emergency.158 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, limitation of fundamental rights can be based on the 
so-called general conditions for the limitation of basic rights and liberties. In Finland the 
Constitutional Law Committee has listed a series of cumulative conditions which must be 
met when limiting fundamental rights by an ordinary act. These conditions are the following:  
                                                        
157 See Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 309/1993 vp, chapter 3.5. 
158 Tuori 2011, 719. 
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1) The limitation has to be based on a law; 
2) The limitation has to be necessary and proportionate; 
3)  The limitation cannot affect the minimum core content of the right in question; 
4)  There has to be a legitimate end for the limitation; 
5)  The scope of the limitation must be sufficiently well defined; 
6)  The limitation must be in accordance with Finland’s obligations under international 
law; and 
7) Individuals’ access to justice cannot be endangered.159  
While these conditions cannot be found in Finnish legislation and have been formulated in 
the constitutional law practice and legal literature, they have widely been considered as 
binding guidelines when limiting fundamental rights.160  
These conditions are, admittedly, somewhat similar to those of the prohibition of 
retrogression. However, the conditions of the prohibition of retrogression are a separate 
series of conditions and operate separately from the conditions listed above. Both sets of 
conditions are of natural relevance, in particular since the approach in those cases should 
advisably aim at the most effective enjoyment of social rights possible. 161  Also, the 
prohibition of retrogression entails certain features inherent to the aim of effective protection 
of social rights and equality. If the legislator looks solely at the general conditions of 
limitation of fundamental rights when implementing potentially regressive measures, the 
measures might have undesirable discriminatory impacts on the most vulnerable groups.162  
Finally, the Finnish system also entails the possibility to limit fundamental rights without 
necessarily complying with any of the mechanisms described above. In those rare cases the 
limitation must be made in the constitutional order of enactment, in accordance with section 
73 of the Constitution.163 
 
 
                                                        
159 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVM 25/1994 vp, 4-5. 
160 Viljanen, ‘Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen’ 2011, 144-7. 
161 Tuori 2011, 719. 
162 Rautiainen 2013, 272-3. 
163 See Viljanen, ’Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen’ 2011, 142. 
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4.3 FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW  
 
The Finnish constitutional system has traditionally been based on the classic idea of 
legislative supremacy. The model of constitutional review in Finland has been ex ante review 
by the Constitutional Law Committee, meaning that the Committee has examined the 
compatibility of a bill with the Constitution when doubts about the constitutionality of the 
bill have arisen. The statements by the Constitutional Law Committee have de facto had the 
same normative relevance as that which the decisions by constitutional courts have had in 
some other countries. Whilst the Committee is a political organ and consists of members of 
Parliament, its statements can be seen as legally persuasive since they are based on textual 
interpretation and travaux preparatoires of the Constitution, Committee’s own precedents 
and opinions of experts of constitutional law.164   
 
The reason for the supremacy of ex ante review can be traced back to the Constitution Act 
of 1919. While the old Constitution did not contain a prohibition of judicial review per se, 
section 92(2) was interpreted so as to preventing courts from examining constitutionality of 
acts of Parliament. Under section 92(2) of the old Constitution, courts and authorities were 
under an obligation not to apply government decrees that conflicted with the Constitution or 
an act of Parliament. The Chancellor of Justice, the Speaker of the Parliament and the 
President of the Republic had certain mandates for constitutional review, but they did not 
have such a significant role as that of the Constitutional Law Committee. Thus, the emphasis 
of the Finnish model of constitutional review was clearly on ex ante review by the 
Committee.165 
 
After decades of following the constitutional doctrine that practically prohibited courts from 
reviewing the constitutionality of ordinary legislation and, consequently, led to a situation 
where courts did not refer to provisions of the Constitution at all,166 this prohibition of 
judicial review was formally removed through the adoption of section 106 of the new 
                                                        
164 Lavapuro Juha, Ojanen Tuomas and Scheinin Martin: ’Rights-based constitutionalism in Finland 
and the development of pluralist constitutional review’ (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 505, 510. 
165 Lavapuro and others 2011, 510-12. 
166 ibid. 
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Constitution in 1999. Section 106 provides for the primacy of the Constitution and, 
consequently, for a possibility of ex post constitutional review by courts: 
 
“If in a matter being tried by a court, the application of an Act of Parliament 
would be in manifest conflict with the Constitution, the court of law shall give 
primacy to the provision in the Constitution.” 
 
The wording of the provision implies that the drafters of the Constitution still wanted to 
maintain the primacy of the ex ante constitutional review by the Constitutional Law 
Committee.167 The threshold for applying section 106 of the Constitution is relatively high. 
In order to apply section 106, the court must find a manifest conflict between an act and the 
Constitution. Moreover, finding a manifest conflict allows a court to give primacy to the 
provision of the Constitution only in that particular case. The court does not have the 
competence to repeal the act as unconstitutional. There are a number of cases where section 
106 has been discussed but not applied168 and a group of cases where the section has been 
applied.169 To shed light on the juridical problems attached to the manifest-conflict criteria 
and to evaluate whether the prohibition of retrogression could be subject to this form of ex 
post constitutional review, I will shortly discuss some of the cases. 
 
In the Supreme Court case KKO 2004:26 a manifest conflict between an ordinary act and 
the Constitution was found to take place and section 106 was applied for the first time. In 
that particular case, environmental authorities had issued a preservation order, prohibiting 
the company from altering the interior of premises of the ground floor of an apartment 
building that it owned. This prevented the company from freely letting out these business 
premises, as it was not possible to carry out the necessary alteration works. The temporary 
                                                        
167 See Government proposal for the 2000 Constitution, Finnish Government Proposal HE 1/1998 
vp, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle uudeksi Suomen Hallitusmuodoksi’, 164 and the Report by the 
Constitutional Law Committee on the proposal, Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVM 
10/1998 vp, 31. 
168 See eg Supreme Court of Finland KKO:2003:107, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, 
KHO:2005:43, Supreme Court of Finland KKO:2006:71, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, 
KHO:2007:77, Supreme Court of Finland KKO:2008:83 and Supreme Court of Finalnd 
KKO:2014:14.  
169 In addition to the cases mentioned below, see eg Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:2004:62, 
Insurance Court of Finland, 6254:2005, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, KHO:2008:25 
and Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:2015:14. 
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preservation order was based on the Act on the Protection of Buildings (Act No. 60 of 1985). 
The company asked the court to order compensation due to the loss of income. The court 
held, by a majority of seven votes to four, that although the act did not provide for 
compensation for damage caused by a temporary preservation order, the company was 
entitled to compensation due to the primacy of the fundamental right to property. Five judges 
found that the application of the act would be in manifest conflict with the property clause 
of the Constitution. Two judges denied this interpretation and four others based their varying 
positions on a constitutional rights-friendly interpretation rather than on examination of the 
manifest-conflict criterion. Whilst section 106 was applied, the court based its reasoning on 
the views of the Constitutional Law Committee on the constitutionality of the legislation in 
the early 1980s, thus failing to consider the more recent constitutional development, in 
particular the constitutional reforms of 1995 and 2000.170 
 
In the Supreme Administrative Court case KHO 2007:77,171 the decision of the Helsinki 
Administrative Court172 was overruled. The Helsinki Administrative Court had found that 
the provision of the Car Tax Act was in a manifest conflict with section 81 of the 
Constitution, which requires that the state tax must be governed by an act, which shall 
contain provisions on the grounds for tax liability and the amount of the tax. However, the 
Supreme Administrative Court held that while the formulation of the impugned provision 
was somewhat vague, its application would not be manifestly unconstitutional. The court 
based its reasoning on the travaux preparatoires of sections 81 and 106 of the Constitution. 
 
Finally, in the most recent case on 4th August 2015, the Helsinki Administrative Court found 
a manifest conflict between the Act on Registered Partnerships (950/2001) and the non-
discrimination clause in section 6(2) of the Constitution.173 Section 10(1) of the Act on 
Registered Partnerships requires that both parties have been habitually resident in Finland 
for two years immediately before the registration. The Marriage Act, however, does not 
entail this kind of a provision. The court noted that neither the government proposal for the 
Act on Registered Partnerships nor the Constitutional Law Committee’s statement regarding 
                                                        
170 Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:2004:26, para 18. 
171 Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, KHO:2007:77. 
172 Helsinki Administrative Court (9 October 2006) HAO 06/1410/1. 
173 Helsinki Administrative Court (4 August 2015) HAO 15/0615/2. 
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the constitutionality of the act contained any considerations concerning the issue. The court 
found that there was no acceptable reason for treating the parties to the case differently on 
the ground of their sexual orientation and held that section 10(1) of the Act on Registered 
Partnerships was in manifest conflict with section 6(2) of the Constitution. It must be noted 
that a bill legalizing same-sex marriage in Finland has been passed by the parliament in 
December 2014 but will not enter into force until March 2017. The bill is the first legislation 
to become an act as the result of a citizen’s initiative. There has been vivid public debate 
concerning this issue in Finland. Considering Finnish courts’ previously reticent approach 
to finding a manifest conflict and giving primacy to the Constitution, the case at hand can 
be seen as a certain kind of statement by the judiciary, both on the right to same-sex marriage 
and on the interpretation of the manifest-conflict criterion. 
 
From these cases one can draw a conclusion that the courts have indeed required the conflict 
between an ordinary act and the Constitution to be nearly self-evident. They have based their 
reasoning on travaux preparatoires of the Constitution and on the views of the 
Constitutional Law Committee vis-à-vis the constitutionality of particular bills at the time 
of their passing. This can be seen as problematic, as it is not possible for the Committee to 
consider all possible individual situations that might emerge in the future and where an act 
could be in conflict with the Constitution. Lavapuro, Ojanen and Scheinin have noted that 
the manifest-conflict criterion creates a problematic grey area between the judicial 
competence under section 106 and the constitutional and human rights orientated 
interpretation. There might appear cases where the conflict between an act and the 
Constitution is less evident but cannot be resolved via the fundamental rights-friendly 
interpretation.174  
 
Moreover, application of section 106 has not been perfectly consistent in the Finnish legal 
practice, as one can see from the so-called paternity cases.175 These cases have dealt with 
the question of whether the provision on the Implementation of the Paternity Act is in 
manifest conflict with the equality clause of the Constitution. The provision requires children 
                                                        
174  Lavapuro and others 2011, 527-30. See also Lavapuro, Juha: Uusi perustuslakikontrolli 
(Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2010), 213-16. 
175 Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:1984 II 85, Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:1993:58, Supreme 
Court of Finland, KKO:2003:107 , Supreme Court of Finland, KKO:2012:11, Supreme Court of 
Finland, KKO:2014:13 and Supreme Court of Finland, KKO 2014:14. 
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who have been born before the entry into force of the Paternity Act to file a paternity suit 
within five years from the entry into force of the act. In four out of these six cases the 
Supreme Court has found the provision to be discriminatory. In two of the cases it has 
expressly refused to apply section 106 of the Constitution. In academic discussion it has 
been argued that these cases demonstrate the problem central to the manifest-conflict 
criterion as the court seemed to put aside the possibility of constitutional rights-friendly 
interpretation. It seemed to think that the only two options available were either the literal 
application of section 7(2) of the Act on the Implementation of the Paternity Act or finding 
a manifest conflict.176 This, of course, cannot be seen as a desirable situation from the 
viewpoint of the effective implementation of human rights. 
 
Regardless of the somewhat reluctant attitude of Finnish courts towards judicial review of 
ordinary legislation, it can be argued that the Finnish model of constitutional review has 
been undergoing certain significant transformations during the past couple of decades. 
Whilst ex ante review by the Constitutional Law Committee is still the supreme form of 
constitutional review in Finland, adoption of section 106 of the Constitution has brought the 
Finnish system closer to the so-called weak-form models of constitutional review.177 I will 
next examine the concrete ways through which the principle of non-regression could be 
taken into account in the Finnish system of constitutional review. 
 
4.4 HOW DOES THE PROHIBITION OF RETROGRESSION OPERATE IN THE 
FINNISH SYSTEM? 
 
As Finnish public authorities are, according to section 22 of the Constitution, under an 
obligation to ensure compliance with international human rights obligations, they are also 
under an obligation to guarantee compliance with the principle of non-regression. As a main 
rule, the principle of non-regression should be taken into account by the legislator. Because 
of its nature, the principle of non-regression should be considered before adopting any 
possibly regressive measures and legislation. Moreover, unjustified regressive measures 
often take place through the repeal of an act that guarantees a certain level of social rights. 
                                                        
176 Scheinin, Martin: ’KKO 2003:107 Isyys. Isyyden vahvistaminen. Perustuslaki. Perusoikeudet. 
Yhdenvertaisuus.’ (2004) 3 Lakimies 532, 537-43. 
177 On the concept of the weak-form review, see Lavapuro 2010, 243-67. See also Lavapuro and 
others 2011, 505-10. 
  46 
 
 
In these situations it is not even possible for a court to refer to legislation that is no more in 
force, not to mention to examine the legality of the revocation. The prohibition of 
retrogression could fall within the scope of ex post judicial review only in exceptional 
situations.178 These situations will be addressed at the end of this chapter. 
 
When we talk about the ex ante review and the principle of non-regression, it is important 
to note that the principle of non-regression must be taken into account by the legislator in 
two kinds of situations. First, the legislator must ensure compliance with the principle when 
passing new ordinary legislation. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
principle should be respected in the context of budgetary decision-making.179 In Finland, the 
drafting process of ordinary legislation normally entails systematic ex ante constitutional 
review by the Constitutional Law Committee and any limitations must be in compliance with 
the general conditions of limitation of fundamental rights. 180  Interestingly enough, the 
budgetary decision-making by the parliament has not de facto been subject to any systematic 
review mechanisms.181 Budget decisions are made in one hearing of the Parliament and the 
decision needs to be supported by merely a simple majority. It follows that while budgetary 
decision-making de facto affects the realisation of social rights in Finland, the decision-
making process itself is not subject to systematic human rights impact assessment and 
constitutional review. This is viewed as problematic from the viewpoint of constitutional 
law.182 Without effective human rights impact assessment vis-à-vis the budget decisions, the 
principle of non-regression can also be disregarded. This, of course, can have a negative 
impact upon the rights of the most vulnerable and, thus, upon equality generally.183 
 
                                                        
178 Rautiainen 2013, 275-6. 
179 See eg Nolan, Aiofe and Dutschke, Mira: ‘Article 2(1) ICESCR and State Parties’ Obligations: 
Whither the Budget?’ (2010) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 280. 
180 See chapter 4.2.  
181 The Constitutional Law Committee has stated that budgetary decisions should be subject to 
fundamental rights impact assessment. See eg Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVM 
25/1994 vp. 
182 Rautiainen 2013, 277-9. 
183 On criticism concerning the lack of human rights impact assesment in the 2015 government 
platform of Finland, see Lavapuro, Juha and Ojanen, Tuomas: ’Hallitusohjelma ja perustuslaki -
tippuiko perustuslaki pois prosessikaaviosta?’ (Perustuslakiblogi, 8 June 2015) at 
https://perustuslakiblogi.wordpress.com/2015/06/08/juha-lavapuro-tuomas-ojanen-hallitusohjelma-
ja-perustuslaki-tippuiko-perustuslaki-pois-prosessikaaviosta/ (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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The Constitutional Law Committee has touched upon the relevance of the prohibition of 
retrogression in some of its statements. It has noted that during an economic recession it 
should be possible, at least to some extent, to take regressive measures and lower the level 
of social rights. According to the Committee, it is logical to take into consideration the state 
of public economy when deciding on the level of services financed by the public sector.184 
Instead of elaborating on the content of the principle of non-regression, the Committee has, 
however, focused mainly upon the obligation to protect the minimum core content of the 
right in question. It has, for instance, stated that organising education as subject to a charge 
could not amount to a decrease in the student places which were free of charge185 and that 
extending the waiting period of unemployment security by two days was not a regressive 
measure of constitutional significance.186 
 
More recently, the Constitutional Law Committee has been required to examine the 
constitutionality of the government proposal on social welfare and health care reform.187 
While the prohibition of retrogression has not been directly addressed, certain related 
observations can be made. First of all, the Committee emphasised that the reform is indeed 
necessary in order to ensure the effective realisation of social rights, in particular of the right 
to basic subsistence under section 19 of the Constitution. It can be argued that through this 
statement the Committee acknowledged the government’s obligation to realise progressively 
social rights. Secondly, the Committee’s reasoning when it rejected the Government’s 
proposal was linked with the principle of non-regression. The Committee rejected the 
proposal because it found that the proposed arrangements would cause unequal economic 
burden to some municipalities. In that sense the evaluation by the Committee was closely 
linked to the principle of equality and, from the viewpoint of the principle of non-regression, 
to the condition of non-discrimination. Here, of course, the measures in question would not 
necessarily have been regressive. Committee’s statements demonstrate, however, that 
principles of equality and non-discrimination are an inherent part of the implementation of 
positive rights. 
                                                        
184 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVM 25/1994 vp. 
185 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 14/2007 vp.  
186 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 16/1996 vp.  
187 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 67/2014 vp; Constitutional Law Committee of 
Finland, PeVL 75/2014 vp and Finnish Government Proposal HE 324/2014 vp, ‘Hallituksen esitys 
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As for the ex post review, it can be argued that the principle of non-regression could be of 
relevance in two types of situations. First, the principle can be taken into account through a 
human rights orientated interpretation. For instance, in relation to the reform of the Act on 
Social Assistance (1412/1997) the Constitutional Law Committee noted that impacts on the 
most vulnerable groups and the creation of new marginalised groups can be avoided through 
a fundamental rights friendly interpretation of the new legislation by courts.188 In practice 
this can lead to situations where a court departs rather significantly from the wording of the 
Social Assistance Act in order to avoid generating new marginalised groups in society and 
to promote equality.189 One can, of course, ask whether it would be more advisable for the 
legislator to seek to already ensure the accomplishment of this goal in the course of the 
drafting process. This criticism is particularly topical in light of the recent decisions of the 
ECSR at a social security level in Finland. In its decision 88/2012, the ECSR found that 
Finland’s level of social security was in violation of article 12(1) of the ESC as it fell below 
50% of median income.190 The Finnish Government sought to justify the level of basic social 
assistance by stating that in addition to the basic amount of the social allowance, a person 
who is entitled to social assistance may receive other forms of assistance.191 The right to 
these other forms of assistance is not, however, a subjective right, but rather subject to certain 
specific criteria. Therefore the ECSR concluded that the level of social security in Finland 
was not sufficient. The ECSR seemed to require the state to guarantee adequate social 
assistance in its legislation for all, so that reaching an adequate level would not be dependent 
upon the fulfilment of certain special prerequisites.192 In that sense one can conclude that 
seeking to secure the fulfilment of social rights through the method of human rights friendly 
interpretation may not be sufficient in light of the Committee’s decision.193 
Secondly, a court may have to consider the application of the principle of non-regression in 
cases where an individual has based her claim on subjective social rights, which are directly 
                                                        
188 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVL 35/2012 vp. 
189 See Rautiainen 2013, 276-7, in particular footnote 74. 
190 ECSR 88/2012, paras 110-25. 
191 ECSR 88/2012, paras 101-9. 
192 ECSR 88/2012, para 120. 
193 On criticism concerning Government’s arguments, see Rautiainen, Pauli: ’Oikeus sosiaaliturvaan 
ei toteudu Suomessa’ (Perustuslakiblogi 11 February 2015) at 
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enforceable through the courts.194 Finland’s Constitution provides for two subjective rights: 
the right to minimum level of subsistence under section 19(2) and the right to free basic 
education under section 16(1). If an individual feels that her subjective constitutional right 
has not been realised, she can raise a claim in front of a court of justice and base her claim 
directly on the constitutional provision, even if ordinary legislation would not grant her that 
right. In these cases the question is, however, more about the Government’s responsibility 
to implement fundamental rights and the direct effect of these rights rather than the 
applicability of the principle of non-regression.195  
Even so, one might contemplate that the principle of non-regression could be of relevance 
in application of section 106 of the Constitution. As noted, public authorities have an 
obligation to ensure compliance with international human rights norms under section 22 of 
the Constitution. Based on the considerations in the first part of the thesis, it can be argued 
that the prohibition of retrogression forms a part of these international human rights 
obligations. Therefore, hypothetically, there could be a situation where an individual’s 
fundamental subjective right, for instance the right to basic subsistence, has not been fully 
realised because of regressive legislative measures. Could a court in this situation find the 
new legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution, in particular with section 22? Judging 
from the previous case law on the interpretation of section 106 of the Constitution, the 
answer to this question appears to be negative. It seems highly unlikely that a court would 
solve this kind of a case through application of section 106. This is, most of all, because the 
threshold for finding a manifest conflict between an ordinary act and the Constitution is 
relatively high. The principle of non-regression is, after all, not a clearly defined legal 
principle and it is not expressly mentioned in any of the applicable human rights instruments, 
not to mention in the Finnish Constitution. Moreover, this kind of a case would probably be 
solved through a fundamental rights-friendly interpretation or through a direct reference to 
the respective subjective social right under the Constitution. If section 106 were to be 
applied, then the manifest conflict would quite likely take place between an ordinary act and 
the subjective constitutional right, without any reference to the principle of non-regression.  
                                                        
194 On the definition of subjective rights, see Tuori, Kaarlo and Kotkas, Tuomas: Sosiaalioikeus 
(WSOYpro 2008), 242-3. 
195 Rautiainen 2013, 276. 
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As demonstrated above, it is certainly not an established rule that claims concerning social 
rights or the constitutionality of ordinary legislation vis-à-vis social rights could be brought 
before courts, as not nearly all of the social rights have been guaranteed as subjective rights. 
This raises the question of whether social rights are de facto effective. In the next chapter I 
will address the issue of effectiveness of social rights. In particular, the focus will be on the 
monitoring system of social rights and on remedies that are available. The first two parts of 
the chapter contain a more theoretical approach to the question of effectiveness of social 
rights and the principle of non-regression. I will try to demonstrate that the effective 
realisation of social rights is important in a democratic society, as there is good reason to 
believe that effective social rights promote equality and democracy. Subsequently, I will 
examine what remedies are available in Finland for an individual when they feel that their 
social rights have not been fully realised and, finally, I will evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Finnish system for the protection of positive rights. 
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5. EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS IN FINLAND  
 
5.1 CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS 
 
It can be argued that the starting point for the effective realisation of social rights is the 
positive attitude in society towards the implementation of social rights. Promoting social 
rights must be seen as one of the fundamental values in the democratic society, and the state 
must be willing to commit itself to the full realisation of social rights.196 However, this is 
only a starting point. In addition to good faith, a state must de facto have the capacity to 
make the realisation of social rights effective. One must ask, therefore, what does this mean 
in practice? 
 
First, there must be an effective supervisory system for the realisation of social rights within 
the state. In particular, the supervisory authorities ought to be capable of assessing 
compliance with the empirical dimension of the prohibition of retrogression, i.e. evaluating 
whether the measures taken have de facto had a regressive impact on the level of social 
rights. This would include both the domestic and the international monitoring mechanisms. 
In chapter 5.3 I will examine the supervisory mechanisms that are relevant in Finland.  
 
Secondly, an individual must have access to effective remedies when she feels that her social 
rights have not been fully realised. With effective remedies for an individual, one can refer 
to the justiciability of social rights; the respective right as directly enforceable within the 
courts. These remedies can, however, entail also so-called administrative remedies.197 While 
                                                        
196 Se eg Burchill, Richard: ’Democracy and the Protection of Socio-Economic Rights’ in Baderin, 
Mashood and McCorquodale, Robert (eds): Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 361-2. 
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an individual cannot enforce any substantive rights through an administrative complaints 
procedure per se, the procedure offers means for an individual to express her dissatisfaction 
with the level of realisation of rights. This makes it possible for an administrative authority 
to detect and intervene in illegal or reprehensible conduct of a social service provider.198 
Administrative complaints procedures are, therefore, closely linked to the idea of effective 
supervisory system. 
 
Finally, the effectiveness of social rights requires comprehensive and continuous human 
rights impact assessment by the legislature, courts and other public authorities. It can be 
argued that through effective human rights impact assessment the principle of non-
regression would also be sufficiently taken into account. 199   Whether this kind of an 
assessment is being carried out is, however, also a question of policy and the predominant 
attitude within the particular state. In the following chapters I will examine whether the 
Finnish system for protection of social rights can be regarded as effective. In doing this I 
will utilise the concept of the proactive model, which is an alternative model for promoting 
effectiveness of social rights as opposed to those based solely on judicial intervention. The 
idea of the proactive model is that the responsibility for addressing ineffectiveness in the 
realisation of social rights, and inequality in the society, lies on those who are best equipped 
to do so. This means that actively promoting the effective realisation of social rights is not 
solely a task of courts and the judicial process, but rather a task of all public authorities.200 
In Finland, these authorities entail, in addition to courts, in particular the legislature and 
administrative supervisory authorities and, to some extent, non-governmental organisations 
in the field of social law.  
 
5.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL RIGHTS AS A TOOL FOR PROMOTING EQUALITY, 
JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 
Before proceeding to examine the effectiveness of the Finnish legal system, one must shortly 
discuss the question of why should social rights be implemented as effectively as possible. 
From the Finnish constitutional law perspective, promoting participation, democracy and 
                                                        
198 Puumalainen, Mikko: ’Mitä Euroopan unionin perusoikeudet merkitsevät laillisuusvalvonnalle?’ 
in Heinonen, Tuuli and Lavapuro, Juha (eds): Oikeuskulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen (Suomalainen 
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199 Rautiainen 2013, 280. 
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justice in society are fundamental principles expressly mentioned in the Constitution of 
Finland. According to section 1(2), the Constitution shall guarantee the inviolability of 
human dignity, the freedom and rights of the individual, and promote justice in society. 
Further, according to section 2(2) of the Constitution, democracy entails the right of the 
individual to participate in and influence the development of society and his or her living 
conditions. According to section 6(1) of the Constitution, everyone is equal before the law. 
The Constitutional Law Committee of Finland has noted that promoting justice in society is 
closely linked with the effective realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.201 The 
obligation of public authorities to guarantee the observance of fundamental and human rights 
in the society can also be seen as crystallising the fundamental values expressed in sections 
1 and 2 of the Constitution.202  
 
It has, indeed, been argued that the effective realisation of social rights promotes equality 
and democracy in society. This is because effective social rights promote the transparency 
of and participation in the decision-making process. This, subsequently, increases the level 
of participation of the most vulnerable groups in the decision-making process and, therefore, 
increases equality in the society.203 Wide participation of the vulnerable groups of society 
then, in turn, strengthens the status of social rights in the society. The FRA, for instance, has 
noted that countries that promote participation and transparency of decision-making tackle 
the challenges of economic crisis much better.204  
 
If one looks at the question from the viewpoint of the principle of non-regression, it can be 
noted that the principle, indeed, aims at tackling the inequality in society. One of the 
cumulative conditions of the principle of non-regression is, as noted above in chapter three, 
that the regressive step cannot be discriminatory or targeted at the most vulnerable groups. 
The importance of the principle of non-regression in protecting equality in society becomes 
                                                        
201  Government proposal for the fundamental rights reform, Finnish Government Proposal HE 
309/1993 vp, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle perustuslakien perusoikeussäännösten 
muuttamisesta’, detailed justifications chapter 1(1). 
202 See  eg Ojanen, Tuomas and Scheinin, Martin: ’Suomen valtiosäännön perusperiaatteet (PL 1 §)’ 
in Hallberg, Pekka, Karapuu, Heikki, Ojanen, Tuomas, Scheinin, Martti, Tuori, Kaarlo and Viljanen, 
Veli-Pekka (eds): Perusoikeudet (WSOYpro 2011), 224-5. 
203 On the role of participation in promoting equality, see Fredman 2008, 105-13 and 199-202.  
204 FRA 2010, 14-5. 
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emphasised in times of economic crisis, as austerity measures create a risk of rising 
inequality.205 
 
As can be seen, effective social rights increase the level of participation in the decision-
making process. Consequently, effective realisation of social rights contributes to the 
effective realisation of civil and political rights, such as the freedom of expression, electoral 
and participatory rights and the freedom of assembly. Also in this sense, therefore, the 
effectiveness of social rights is of importance. Further, this implies that too strict a distinction 
between so-called negative and positive rights may be artificial and harmful for the effective 
implementation of human rights as a whole.206 
 
5.3 REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN FINLAND 
 
As noted above, most of the positive rights are not directly enforceable in courts. This is not 
to say that Finnish courts would not treat subjective social rights and their dimensions as 
justiciable. The Supreme Administrative Court deals annually with several cases concerning 
the right to basic subsistence.207 Also the right to basic education is directly enforceable and 
has been applied by courts also ex officio.208 There are, however, several other positive 
rights that are not subjective rights and as such not directly enforceable. The purpose of this 
chapter is to find out whether there are effective remedies for individuals in Finland vis-à-
vis realisation of these social rights. I will first cast light upon the domestic administrative 
remedies available for individuals. As the ICESCR and ESC provide for certain monitoring 
and complaints procedures available for people living in Finland, these supranational 
mechanisms will also be addressed.  
 
For a start, it must be noted that with administrative remedies, for the purposes of this thesis, 
one refers to domestic supervising mechanisms. The purpose of these mechanisms is to 
                                                        
205 Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, ‘Austerity measures – a 
danger for democracy and social rights’ (7 June 2012). Available at http://www.andrej-
hunko.de/start/aktuell/1105-austerity-measures-a-danger-for-democracy-and-social-rights.  
206 See eg Tuori 2011, 712. 
207 On the cases dealt with in 2014, see eg Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, KHO:2014:136, 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, KHO:2014:178 and Supreme Administrative Court of 
Finland, KHO:2014:196.  
208 See eg Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, KHO:2009:33. 
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ensure that customers of social welfare and health care services receive appropriate treatment 
and their rights as customers are being respected. The importance of these mechanisms lies 
in particular in supervising the realisation of those positive rights that derive from the field 
of constitutional law but do not have a status of subjective rights. One cannot, however, 
enforce the substantive content of any positive rights through these mechanisms, not even 
of subjective rights. Only courts have the competence to handle appeals.  
 
In Finland it is the responsibility of a municipality to organise necessary social welfare and 
health care services within its region, as stipulated in Act on Social Welfare, section 14 
(1301/2014).209 Municipalities have, of course, the responsibility to supervise its service 
providers and a customer can file a complaint directly to the municipality in question. As 
public authorities, municipalities are equally obligated to ensure compliance with 
fundamental rights and human rights in accordance with section 22 of the Constitution.210 In 
addition to this, the Government carries out nationwide supervising. Tuori separates between 
different administrative monitoring systems based on the differences in instituting the 
proceedings. In his view, there are three relevant categories of proceedings: 
 
1) Supervising service providers in the course of the licensing process; 
2) Ex officio supervising by the supervisory authority; and 
3) Supervisory process triggered by an administrative complaint of an individual.211 
 
For the purposes of this thesis the third category is of further interest. An individual can file 
her administrative complaint, depending on the particular situation, either to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, National Supervisory Authority for 
Welfare and Health (Valvira), or to one of the six Regional State Administrative Agencies 
(Aluehallintovirastot). Filing an administrative complaint means informing the supervisory 
authority about possible illegalities or other reprehensible conduct related to implementation 
of social welfare and health services.  Competence of the Chancellor of Justice and the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman derive from the Constitution of Finland. According to its section 
                                                        
209 See also Tuori and Kotkas 2008, 30. 
210  Viljanen, Veli-Pekka: ’Perusoikeuksien soveltamisala’ in Hallberg, Pekka, Karapuu, Heikki, 
Ojanen, Tuomas, Scheinin, Martti, Tuori, Kaarlo and Viljanen, Veli-Pekka (eds): Perusoikeudet 
(WSOYpro 2011), 116-19. 
211 Tuori and Kotkas 2008, 628. 
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108(1), the Chancellor of Justice shall ensure that the courts of law, the other authorities and 
the civil servants, public employees and other persons, when the latter are performing a 
public task, obey the law and fulfil their obligations. In the performance of his or her duties, 
the Chancellor of Justice monitors the implementation of basic rights and liberties and 
human rights. Further, in section 109(1) of the Constitution it has been provided for the 
similar mandate of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The Parliamentary Ombudsman has 
noted in his annual reports that since 2000 nearly all supervisory tasks of the Ombudsman 
have entailed issues related to constitutional rights and human rights.212 It has been noted 
that currently Ombudsman’s supervisory proceedings seems to be one of the most important 
mechanisms for ensuring the effective protection of constitutional and human rights in 
Finland.213  
 
Yet another supervisory authority should be mentioned in this context. Starting from June 
2015, the National Discrimination and Equality Tribunal of Finland has been appointed by 
the Government to supervise compliance with the Non-Discrimination Act and the Act on 
Equality between Women and Men both in private activities and in public administrative 
and commercial activities. The tribunal is an impartial and independent judicial body and it 
has the mandate to prohibit continued or repeated discrimination and impose a conditional 
fine to enforce compliance with its injunctions and order payment of such a fine. The tribunal 
does not, however, have competence to order compensation to be paid. A decision of the 
tribunal may be appealed to the competent Administrative Court.214 
 
As for monitoring systems organised by international organs, one should mention the state 
reporting system under the ESC, the collective complaint system under the additional 
protocol to the ESC, the state reporting procedure under the ICESCR and the individual 
complaints procedure and inter-state communications under the optional protocol to the 
ICESCR215. All of these mechanisms are available remedies also in Finland, as Finland is a 
state party to both of these human rights instruments and has ratified both of the protocols. 
                                                        
212 Eduskunnan oikeusasiamiehen toimintakertomus vuodelta 2014 (Juvenes Print 2015), 58. 
213 Lavapuro and others 2011, 521. See also Lavapuro 2010, 42-3. 
214  National Discrimination and Equality Tribunal of Finland at http://yvtltk.fi/en/index.html 
(accessed 4 August 2015).  
215 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (adopted 
10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013). 
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The monitoring system under the ESC is divided into the so-called reporting procedure and 
the collective complaints procedure. The reporting procedure means that each state delivers 
a periodic report on the implementation of the rights under the ESC to the ECSR, and after 
examination of the report the ECSR issues its conclusion on compliance with the respective 
rights within that state. Under the additional protocol to the ESC, complaints of violations 
of the ESC may be lodged with the ECSR by organisations.216 As can be seen, the ESC does 
not establish a system for an individual complaint procedure. On the European regional 
level, this kind of a mechanism is available under the ECHR, but as noted above, the ECHR 
concerns solely civil and political rights. Social rights could have some relevance in 
proceedings of the ECtHR mainly through application of the non-discrimination clause in 
the ECHR.  
 
Unlike the supervisory mechanism of the ESC, the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol do not 
provide for a collective complaint procedure. A state party to the ICESCR is, likewise, 
required to submit periodic reports on compliance with the ICESCR to the CESCR. 
Moreover, as Finland has ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and it has entered 
into force on 30 April 2014 (Finnish Government Decree 17/2014), it is now possible for an 
individual or a group of individuals to submit a communication to the CESCR, claiming to 
be a victim of a violation of any of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the 
ICESCR. These rights entail, inter alia, article 2(1) and the principle of progressive 
realisation. According to article 3 of the Optional Protocol a communication is admissible if 
all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. Moreover, the communication has to 
be filed within a year from the exhaustion of local remedies and the communication has to 
be compatible ratione loci, ratione temporis and ratione materiae with the ICESCR. A 
communication must be in writing and the same matter cannot be examined by another 
international organ. Exhaustion of local remedies is, admittedly, a common condition of 
admissibility in international human rights law. 217  Remedies that are available after 
violations of social rights do, however, somewhat differ from those that are available after a 
                                                        
216  Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints (adopted 9 November 1995, entered into force 1 July 1998) CETS 158. 
217 See Finnish Government Proposal HE 74/2012 vp, ‘Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle taloudellisia, 
sosiaalisia ja sivistyksellisiä oikeuksia koskevan kansainvälisen yleissopimuksen valinnaisen 
pöytäkirjan hyväksymisestä ja laiksi pöytäkirjan lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten 
voimaansaattamisesta’, detailed justifications of article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 
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violation of civil and political rights. In Finland, as demonstrated above, domestic system of 
remedies comprises various administrative complaint procedures. During the drafting 
process of the protocol states had differing opinions on as to whether also administrative 
remedies should be exhausted before submitting a communication to the CESCR in 
accordance with the Optional Protocol. The situation has been left somewhat unclear, and 
will possibly require a clarifying statement from the CESCR in the future.218  
 
From the viewpoint of the principles of progressive realisation and non-regression, article 
8(4) of the Optional Protocol is of particular interest. According to article 8(4) of the 
Protocol, the CESCR shall consider the reasonableness of the steps taken by the state party. 
In doing so, the CESCR shall bear in mind that the state party may adopt a range of possible 
policy measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the Covenant. By including 
this provision in the protocol, parties sought to ensure that the CESCR would not have too 
wide a mandate to evaluate governments’ economic and budgetary choices. 219  It is 
nevertheless interesting that this mechanism now, at least technically, allows an individual 
to file a complaint concerning state’s failure to comply with the principle of non-regression.  
 
To conclude, there are several domestic and supranational supervisory mechanisms for 
supervising the effective implementation of social rights. These mechanisms do not, 
however, entail the same judicial mandate as what the domestic courts have when they 
examine the realisation of subjective social rights enforceable in courts. One may ask, 
therefore, whether the Finnish system of monitoring and remedies sufficiently promotes the 
effectiveness of social rights and, subsequently, increases equality and democracy in the 
society.220 In the next chapter I will try to answer to this question.  
 
 
 
                                                        
218  See eg Hyttinen, Sanna: ‘Kauan odotettu valitusmahdollisuus taloudellisia, sosiaalisia ja 
sivistyksellisiä oikeuksia koskevaan yleissopimukseen’ (2009) 2 Oikeus 207, 211. 
219 Hyttinen 2009, 212-14. 
220 On the interrelationship between effectiveness of positive rights and democracy, see eg Fredman 
2008, 38-40. 
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5.4 EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FINNISH SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
First, it must be noted that as a state party to the ICESCR and the ESC, Finland is under an 
obligation to provide individuals with effective remedies and to monitor the implementation 
of social rights. Moreover, as demonstrated above, Finland has committed itself to the 
effective realisation of social rights and to compliance with the prohibition of retrogression 
inter alia through sections 1, 2 and 22 of the Constitution. 
 
Under the ICESCR, the state has a right to implement social rights through non-legislative 
measures also. This does not mean that taking non-legislative measures could justify a 
situation where effective remedies do not exists. Quite the opposite; the state should ensure 
that the remedies may be sought either from judicial or administrative authorities.221 The 
ECSR has stated that especially in times of economic crisis “governments are bound to take 
all necessary steps to ensure that the rights of the Charter are effectively guaranteed at a 
period of time when beneficiaries need protection the most”.222 
 
Secondly, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the prohibition of retrogression requires a state 
to conduct sufficient research and analysis into the impact of any regressive measures on 
vulnerable groups in order to ascertain the measure that has the most minimal impact on the 
rights of the most vulnerable groups. Therefore, it can be argued that conducting a social 
rights impact assessment is an inherent part of the obligation not to take any unnecessary 
regressive steps. The FRA has considered human rights impact assessment as crucial in 
revealing how the overall burden of regressive measures is being shared between different 
groups of society. 223  Conducting sufficient impact assessment prevents the state from 
violating the principle of non-regression and promotes the effectiveness of social rights. 
Next, I will evaluate whether the Finnish system of monitoring makes it possible to carry 
out this kind of analysis. 
 
                                                        
221 CESCR, General Comment 3, paras 5-7. See also Maastricht Guidelines, paras 16 and 22-3. 
222 European Committee of Social Rights, ‘General introduction to Conclusions XIX-2 (2009)’, 12-
3. 
223 FRA 2010, 20. 
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The idea of so-called proactive models of monitoring is to acknowledge that equality 
between citizens requires a state not only to refrain from violating the right to equality but 
also to actively promote it.224 This can happen, for instance, through effective realisation of 
social rights. Proactive models are not based merely on the competence of courts to review 
whether rights have been violated, but on the idea that all public authorities should 
participate in addressing structural and institutional inequalities in the society.225  
 
In Finland, monitoring compliance with human rights and fundamental rights is, as noted 
above, one of the most important tasks of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor 
of Justice. Both authorities provide an annual report on their supervisory activities, and the 
Constitutional Law Committee has found that the report should entail a section on the 
realisation of fundamental rights and human rights.226 The Finnish model for monitoring 
compliance with social rights is strongly based on the mandate of administrative authorities 
to receive administrative complaints and to conduct supervision. Whilst administrative 
authorities do not have the authority to decide on the implementation of regressive 
legislation and, consequently, effectively supervise compliance with the principle of non-
regression, they can spot areas where social rights are not being fully realised. This, in turn, 
can indicate to the legislature how they might promote the realisation of social rights; i.e. 
what the next progressive step of the state should be. Citizens’ administrative complaints 
can also be useful in evaluating compliance with the empirical dimension of the principle of 
non-regression, i.e. whether new legislation has de facto had a negative impact on the level 
of social rights in Finland. In this sense the supervisory work of the administrative authorities 
complements the monitoring system, and the Finnish system can be argued to have certain 
characteristics of a proactive model.227 
 
In the effective realisation of social rights in Finland - in addition to the work of 
administrative authorities - the role of non-governmental organisations is also, to some 
extent, relevant. As the additional protocol to the ESC now provides for a system of 
collective complaints and has been ratified by Finland, non-governmental organisations can 
                                                        
224 Fredman 2008, 189. 
225 Ibid. 
226 Constitutional Law Committee of Finland, PeVM 25/1994 vp. 
227  As a principle, the prohibition of retrogression by definition affects the work of all public 
authorities. See Scheinin 1991, 37. 
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submit complaints on “unsatisfactory application” of the ESC. According to the preamble of 
the additional protocol, the purpose of the collective complaints procedure is to “improve 
the effective enforcement of the social rights guaranteed by the Charter”. The Finnish 
Society of Social Rights (“Suomen Sosiaalioikeudellinen Seura r.y.”) filed a complaint in 
December 2012 on the inadequate level of social security in Finland. As elaborated in the 
previous chapters, this led the ECSR to find that Finland was not complying with articles 
12(1) and 13(1) of the ESC.  
 
As for the effectiveness of social rights in Finnish courts, it has been noted in the academic 
discussion that courts do not tend to refer to social rights in their legal practice. In fact, it has 
proven to be relatively difficult to get access to any data on the number of cases where social 
rights would have been referred to.228 When the courts have invoked social rights, they have 
referred to them merely as fundamental rights but have not simultaneously referred to 
respective human rights. This can be seen as problematic from the viewpoint of effectiveness 
for two reasons: first, the catalogue of social fundamental rights in the Constitution of 
Finland does not codify all the social rights provided for in the ICESCR. Those social rights 
are, however, binding in Finland as international human rights norms and must be protected, 
as stipulated in section 22 of the Constitution. Second, even though the level of domestic 
protection of fundamental rights has traditionally been thought to be higher than that of 
international human rights,229 it is possible that the international minimum standards evolve 
through the practice of the international supervisory bodies, such as the ECSR and the 
CESCR.230 In that sense the domestic courts should be aware of the recent practice of these 
organs in order to effectively protect social rights in Finland. 
 
As for the effectiveness of the prohibition of retrogression in the Finnish courts, one 
particular case can be mentioned. In the Supreme Court case KKO:2008:83 a group of 
pensioners sought compensation from the state because of reductions in their pensions. They 
argued, inter alia, that the regressive legislation was in manifest conflict with the property 
clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not, however, address any substantive 
                                                        
228  See Hyttinen, Sanna: ‘Sosiaaliset ihmisoikeudet ja suomalaiset tuomioistuimet – otetaanko 
sosiaaliset ihmisoikeudet vakavasti?’ Oikeus 4 (2012) 496, 496-515. 
229 See, for instance, Rautiainen 2013, 267-8. 
230 Hyttinen 2012, 511-13. 
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issues in the judgement, as it found that the question of compensation should be addressed 
by the Insurance Court and only after individuals had received concrete decisions on the 
amount of their pension.231 The case at hand demonstrates well the problem attached to the 
ex post review of compliance with the prohibition of retrogression. First, the reduction in the 
level of rights of an individual cannot be seen as a violation of the principle of non-regression 
per se.232 A more comprehensive analysis on the regressive impact of measures would be 
required. Second, the claims raised in courts often concern violations of subjective social 
rights or, as in the case at hand, the right to property. The prohibition of retrogression can, 
however, be disregarded also by decreasing the level of other social rights, i.e. those not 
directly enforceable through courts. From the viewpoint of effectiveness of social rights this 
distinction between different social rights might appear problematic; when the Government 
has an absolute obligation to guarantee the effective enjoyment of certain subjective social 
rights, the realisation of other social rights might not be sufficiently considered during the 
budgetary decision-making process.233 
Finally, it must be asked whether the realisation of social rights can be effective if the 
budgetary decision-making is not subject to systematic human rights impact assessment. 
Budgetary decisions have, after all, an important role in allocating state resources. The fact 
that this allocation of resources is not subject to systematic constitutional and human rights 
review has been seen as problematic.234 Social rights often pose positive obligations for a 
state, and therefore state compliance with the principles of progressive realisation and non-
regression are closely linked with the amount of available resources. The Government’s 
budgetary decisions are not, however, subject to ex ante constitutional review by the 
Constitutional Law Committee, at least not to the same extent as new legislative proposals.  
 
In Finland, the municipalities have the right to self-government and they are responsible for 
the realisation of rights that derive from the social rights guaranteed in the Constitution. 
They are not, however, under an obligation to make sure that they allocate sufficient 
resources for this purpose in their budgets. This has been seen as one of the major problems 
                                                        
231 Supreme Court of Finland KKO:2008:83, paras 6-8. 
232 Rautiainen 2013, 275. 
233 Puumalainen 2012, 273-4. 
234 See eg Puumalainen 2012, 273-4  and Rautiainen 2013, 276-9. 
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of the effective realisation of social rights in Finland.235 It must be noted that the Government 
cannot escape its responsibility to guarantee compliance with the prohibition of retrogression 
and the effective implementation of social rights by delegating the realisation of social rights 
to municipalities. If the municipalities cannot provide adequate services due to shortage of 
resources, it is the Government who is responsible for any violations of social rights.236 
Therefore, the Government should ensure that its budgetary decision-making and resource 
allocations are in compliance with the state’s human rights obligations, in particular with the 
prohibition of retrogression. 
 
Budgetary decision-making has not been subject to systematic human rights impact 
assessment and constitutional review partly because it has been traditionally seen as a 
political, rather than a legal, process.237 However, in light of section 22 of the Constitution, 
this should not be the case. As all public authorities are under an obligation to guarantee the 
observance of human rights, the budgetary decisions should also be subject to human rights 
impact assessment, particularly since it is arguably the most effective way to ensure 
compliance with the principle of non-regression.   
                                                        
235 Rautiainen 2013, 277. 
236 Viljanen, ’Perusoikeuksien soveltamisala’ 2011, 118. 
237 Rautiainen 2013, 279. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The prohibition of retrogression places an obligation upon the state to avoid taking any 
unnecessary regressive steps when progressively realising social rights. The underlying idea 
of this prohibition is to ensure that states would not arbitrarily depart from the objective of 
effective realisation of social rights. The effective realisation of social rights can be seen as 
a crucial factor in promoting equality and democracy in society, as it promotes the 
participation of the most vulnerable groups in the decision-making process. In that sense, 
the traditional distinction of economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights 
into so-called positive duties and duties of restraint can be seen as somewhat artificial. 
Effective realisation of social rights requires the effective realisation of civil and political 
rights, and vice versa. Moreover, both groups of rights entail dimensions of both positive 
and negative obligations.  
 
The first aim of this thesis was to find what is the normative nature of the prohibition of 
retrogression and which conditions does the prohibition consist of. The prohibition of 
retrogression has its origins in article 2(1) of the ICESCR and can also be derived from 
article 12(3) of the ESC. It operates together with the principle of progressive realisation, 
which requires a state to achieve progressively the full realisation of social rights and aim 
towards the imaginary, “perfect” level of rights. This does not, however, mean that states 
would in all situations be prohibited from taking any regressive steps. 
 
In the course of the current economic crisis, several European countries have been almost 
forced to resort to certain austerity measures due to the lack of resources. Consequently, 
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several supranational human rights bodies and domestic constitutional courts have given 
decisions and statements on the justifiability of these measures. From these statements one 
can ascertain certain requirements which are consistently imposed by the prohibition of 
retrogression: the regressive measure has to be temporary; it has to be necessary and 
proportionate; it cannot be discriminatory, and; the legislature has to protect the minimum 
core content of the right in question.  
 
If one compares these requirements to the general conditions of the limitation of fundamental 
rights in Finland, certain parallels can be drawn. With that said, the conditions also do 
somewhat differ from each other. First, the general conditions of limitation in Finland do not 
entail the requirement of impermanence. Instead, it is one of the conditions of provisional 
expectations to fundamental rights in situations of an emergency under section 23 of the 
Constitution of Finland. Secondly, even though the protection of the minimum core content 
is a part of both of these series of conditions, the domestic threshold of the minimum level 
of rights may be higher than the one under international human rights law. Lastly, the 
requirement of non-discrimination is inherent to the principle of non-regression only. It 
reflects the overall idea behind the effective realisation of social rights; legislature and all 
public authorities of a democratic society should always seek to promote equality and ensure 
that regressive measures do not have a negative impact on the rights of the most vulnerable 
groups. 
 
Compliance with the prohibition of retrogression should, to a great extent, be secured by the 
legislator when implementing possibly regressive legislation or deciding on the state’s 
budget. The prohibition may, however, have relevance in courts through a human-rights 
friendly interpretation or application of certain subjective social rights that can be directly 
enforced through courts. The prohibition of retrogression operates mostly as a principle and 
can be tackled by a weightier principle in individual situations of application. The 
prohibition can sometimes, however, operate as an absolute rule; for instance, when there is 
a risk that a regressive measure might fail to protect the minimum core content of the social 
right in question. 
 
The second aim of this thesis was to find out whether the realisation of social rights in 
Finland passes the test of effectiveness and, in particular, how the principle of non-regression 
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operates in the Finnish system of constitutional review and human rights impact assessment. 
The realisation of social rights can be regarded as effective if there are sufficient monitoring 
systems for noticing de facto regression of the level of social rights and, consequently, for 
addressing inequalities in the society. Moreover, one factor of effectiveness can be argued 
as the need for effective remedies to be made available to an individual. Both of these factors 
contribute to conducting a systematic human-rights impact assessment of potentially 
regressive measures. Compliance with the prohibition of retrogression would be taken into 
account in the course of this assessment. 
 
In the Finnish system, compliance with the prohibition of retrogression is being reviewed by 
the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament in the course of its ex ante constitutional 
review process. The prohibition may, technically speaking, be subject to ex post review by 
the courts, but this has yet to take place and can be seen as a highly hypothetical situation 
for two reasons. First, the Finnish system of constitutional review has its emphasis strongly 
on the ex ante review by the Constitutional Law Committee. Secondly, the prohibition of 
retrogression should, by definition, be taken into account by the legislature before deciding 
on any potentially regressive measures. This requires conducting a sufficient analysis on the 
potential impacts on social rights and exploring alternative options before resorting to any 
measures. If the prohibition were to be considered by courts, this would happen through a 
human rights friendly interpretation or the application of subjective social rights rather than 
the direct application of the prohibition itself. 
 
The Finnish system of monitoring can be argued to have some characteristics of so-called 
proactive models, which are based on the idea that addressing inequalities in society and 
promoting effectiveness of fundamental rights and human rights is the responsibility of all 
public authorities. Whilst models that are based on the judicial process often only review 
whether social rights of an individual have been violated, proactive models seek to recognise 
the positive dimension of social rights, i.e. to actively promote the effective realisation of 
those rights. Section 22 of the Constitution of Finland provides for the responsibility of all 
public authorities to guarantee observance of fundamental and human rights. The monitoring 
system in Finland for the protection of social rights is, to a great extent, based on the 
supervisory work of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice and other 
administrative supervisory authorities. The supervisory mechanisms of the ICESCR and the 
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ESC are also of relevance in Finland, particularly as non-governmental organisations can 
submit collective complaints on alleged violations of the ESC to the ECSR. In that sense, it 
could be argued that several quarters are actively participating in the process of effective 
realisation of social rights in Finland. 
 
From the viewpoint of the prohibition of retrogression, the single largest gap in the Finnish 
system of human rights review can be argued to be the fact that budgetary decision-making 
process is not subject to systematic ex ante constitutional review and human rights impact 
assessment. Budgetary decisions, whilst not being new legislation per se, de facto determine 
the allocation of available resources within the state. As such, compliance with the 
prohibition of retrogression, in particular evaluating whether the decisions have a negative 
impact on the most vulnerable groups, should be assessed in the course of the budgetary 
decision-making process. 
 
Insufficient human rights impact assessment vis-à-vis budgetary decision-making can be 
seen as a core problem attached to the effective operation of the prohibition of retrogression. 
Whilst it is understandable - and realistic - that the level of resources available for a state 
often decreases during an economic turmoil, economic recession does not justify the lack of 
sufficient human rights impact assessment when reacting to the economic situation by taking 
austerity measures. Quite the contrary, a democratic welfare state has the responsibility to 
promote the effective realisation of social rights and to protect vulnerable groups particularly 
at times of an economic crisis, as there is a real risk of rising inequality in the society. 
Therefore, as a de lege ferenda suggestion, it is submitted that budgetary decision-making 
process should be subject to more systematic human rights impact assessment; in particular 
from the perspective of the prohibition of retrogression. This would more efficiently 
guarantee that the resource allocations have been made, from the beginning, in the most 
equal and equitable manner available. 
 
Finally, a few words can be said on the future academic research to come. As noted in the 
beginning of the thesis, the recent economic recession has had a European-wide impact. A 
comprehensive study on the negative impact on the level of social rights in European states 
during the crisis would require access to statistics on the de facto situation and level of rights. 
Evaluating whether states have managed to comply with the empirical dimension of the 
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prohibition of retrogression is challenging, but would be useful in addressing inequalities 
and areas that need more protection. Some studies have, of course, been carried out, but the 
focus has not been on assessing compliance with the prohibition of retrogression. On the 
Finnish level, further research on the budgetary decision-making process within 
municipalities and its impact on the level of social rights could be carried out. Of particular 
interest, from the constitutional legal perspective, is the question of whether differences in 
resource allocations between municipalities create inequalities between them and how this 
might be avoided. 
 
